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Essays on Monetary Policy with Informational Frictions
Chengcheng Jia
This dissertation contains three essays on monetary policy under informational frictions. All
three chapters study the situation in which the private sector has imperfect information about the
underlying economy and extracts information about the unobserved shocks from the central bank’s
interest rate decisions. In this situation, monetary policy has an informational effect, in addition to
its direct effect on the nominal budget of the household.
Chapter 1 studies how the equilibrium interest rate of an optimizing discretionary central bank
is changed when the interest rate has an informational effect. I build a New Keynesian model
in which firms are subject to both nominal frictions and informational frictions. There are two
types of aggregate shocks in the private sector: the natural-rate shock, which is mapped from
the aggregate component of technology shocks, and the cost-push shock, which is mapped from
the aggregate component of wage-markup shocks. The central bank has perfect information on
the realization of shocks, and has only one policy instrument which is the nominal interest rate.
Private agents do not observe the realization of shocks, and use the interest rate as a public signal
to extract information about the shocks. I show that the equilibrium discretionary monetary policy
reacts more aggressively to natural-rate shocks and less aggressively to cost-push shocks, relative
to the optimal response under perfect information.
Chapter 2 analyzes how the informational effect of interest rates leads to the gains from com-
mitment, and its implications on optimal direct communication strategy. Built upon the model
in the previous chapter, I show how commitment to a state-contingent policy rule can change the
sensitivity of expected shocks to the interest rate. The key mechanism that yields the gains from
commitment is analyzed through the lens of the Phillips curve, which shows the output gap versus
inflation trade-off becomes endogenous to the central bank’s interest-rate decisions. In addition
to the informational gains from policy commitment, this chapter also studies the optimal direct
communication strategy which interacts with the informational effect through policy rates.
Finally, Chapter 3 explores the optimal strategy for the central bank to conduct monetary policy
when both the private sector and the central bank face imperfect information. Forward guidance
is modeled as the central bank providing its expectations on monetary policy, conditional on its
own imperfect information. I compare three strategies of forward guidance. The first strategy is
called instrument-based forward guidance, in which case the central bank announces and commits
to its estimate of future policy actions conditional on its information which is currently noisy. The
second strategy is called Delphic forward guidance, in which case the central bank only reveals
its noisy information, and waits to decide the actual monetary policy when perfect information
becomes available. I show that the optimal Delphic forward guidance involves the central bank
doing backward induction, by which it takes into account the change in the beliefs in the private
sector due to re-optimization in later periods. Lastly, I show the optimal monetary policy is the
rule-based Odyssean forward guidance, which is a state-contingent commitment that specifies how
the central bank reacts to both the actual shock and the noise in its own information.
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Chapter 1
Monetary Policy with the Informational
Effect of Interest Rates
1
1.1 Introduction
It has become widely accepted that the effect that monetary policy has on the economy depends on
the beliefs held by the private sector. While the importance of expectations is well established, the
majority of previous literature assumes beliefs are exogenous to monetary policy decisions. In this
chapter, I study the case in which the central bank has better information than the private sector
about the state of the economy. In this case, private agents find it optimal to use the interest rate
as a public signal to extract information about the underlying economy. Consequently, monetary
policy has informational effect on the beliefs in the private sector in addition to the direct effect on
the nominal budget of the household.
The informational effect of monetary policy builds on the assumption of informational frictions
in the private sector. Previous literature has studied both the case in which the central bank is better
informed about relevant economic fundamentals than the private sector and the case in which
the central bank has less precise information than the private sector does. With few exceptions,
the majority of these papers assume that the expectations formed in the private sector about the
underlying state of the economy are independent of monetary policy decisions. However, recent
empirical papers demonstrate that changes in the interest rate also affect the beliefs in the private
sector about economic fundamentals.1 In this paper, I study how the equilibrium interest rate of an
optimizing discretionary central bank is changed by the informational effect of monetary policy.
I build a New Keynesian model with Calvo price rigidity and information frictions in the private
sector. There are two types of shocks: natural-rate shocks and cost-push shocks. Due to imperfect
information, the equilibrium output gap and inflation depend on both the actual shocks and the
beliefs about the shocks, as well as the interest rate decisions by the central bank.
1See Romer and Romer (2000), Romer and Romer (2004), Campbell et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson
(2013) as examples of empirical studies on the informational effect of monetary policy.
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The central bank is assumed to have perfect information about both types of shocks. It sets the
interest rate conditional on the actual shocks to minimize its loss function given by the weighted
sum of squared inflation and the output gap. Private agents with rational expectations correctly
understand the best response of the interest rate to different shocks. Therefore, they regard the
interest rate as a public signal which simultaneously provides information about the two shocks.
In this situation, the interest rate has two effects on the equilibrium in the private sector: the
traditionally studied direct effect on the cost of borrowing for consumers and the informational
effect on the beliefs in the private sector.
I study a discretionary central bank which sets the interest-rate at any given state of the econ-
omy and takes the informational effect of its interest rate decisions to be exogenous. To study
how the equilibrium interest rate under imperfect information differs from the one under perfect
information, I start with the simple case in which shocks have no serial correlations. Private agents
are rational. They correctly understand how interest rates react to both shocks but have imperfect
information about the shocks. Private agents form beliefs through a Bayesian updating process,
whereby they regard the interest rate set by the central bank as a signal to extract information about
the two shocks. When the interest rate reacts positively to both shocks, it becomes one signal that
jointly provides information to the two shocks. When the private sector forms expectation about
one shock, the prior distribution of the other shock becomes the source of noise in the signal. I
demonstrate that beliefs formed through a Bayesian updating process are more sensitive to the
shock to which the interest rate responds more aggressively or has a higher ex-ante dispersion.
I start with the situation where shocks have no serial correlation, in which case beliefs about
future equilibrium do not play a role in determining current inflation and the output gap. The
informational effect applies differently to the equilibrium output gap and inflation. I assume that
the consumer is able to observe the current price levels, but that each individual firm does not
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observe the aggregate price level. Consequently, the output gap is free from the expectations.
However, inflation depends on the beliefs in the private sector, as optimal pricing decisions are
strategic complements, where the resetting price of each firm also depends on the firm’s expectation
about the aggregate price level. Thus, the interest rate changes the output gap only through the
direct effect, but affects inflation through both the direct effect and the informational effect. When
the central bank reacts to expansionary shocks by increasing the interest rate,2 the informational
effect dampens the direct effect of the increase in the interest rate, as the private sector updates its
beliefs about the expansionary shocks.
To compare how the equilibrium interest rate for a discretionary central bank is changed due
to the informational effect, I first examine how the informational effect of the interest rate changes
the Phillips curve. The Phillips curve is the constraint that a central bank faces, which captures
the co-movement of the output gap and inflation as a result of changes in interest rates. After a
marginal increase in the interest rate, the direct effect on a household’s cost of borrowing decreases
both the output gap and inflation, which results in a positively sloped Phillips curve under perfect
information. However, under imperfect information, as the informational effect dampens the direct
effect on inflation, the Phillips curve becomes flatter than that under perfect information.
In addition, the informational effect of monetary policy also changes the intercept of the
Phillips curve. Under perfect information, an intercept is only induced by the cost-push shock,
as the cost-push shock increases inflation only without changing the natural output level. This
positive intercept of the Phillips curve leads to stabilization bias, which is the conflict between
the closing the output gap and minimizing inflation. Under perfect information, a central bank
increases the interest rate to partially offset the effect of the cost-push shock on inflation, which
2I use the term "expansionary shocks" to refer to the shocks that cause positive output gap or inflation without the
response of interest rates. That is, positive natural-rate shocks (negative current TFP shocks) and positive cost-push
shocks.
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results in a positive inflation and a negative output gap. Under imperfect information, the Phillips
curve has an intercept after both natural-rate shocks and cost-push shocks. This is because private
agents always assign a positive possibility to the event that a cost-push shock is realized, once they
observe tightening monetary policy. If the realized shock is an actual cost-push shock, the inter-
cept is reduced, because private agents also assign positive positive possibility to the event that a
natural-rate shock is realized in which case there is no stabilization bias.
I solve for the Markov perfect equilibrium between the central bank and the private sector. The
private sector forms beliefs and makes optimal consumption and pricing decisions while expect-
ing the central bank to play the equilibrium optimizing interest rate at any state of the economy.
The central bank optimizes the interest rate to minimize the deviations of inflation and the output
gap from their targets, taking as given the informational effect of its interest rate decision. A dis-
cretionary central bank does not internalize the change in the informational effect when making
interest rate decisions.
The change in the Phillips curve under imperfect information leads to a change in the op-
timizing discretionary monetary policy in equilibrium. Although the natural-rate shock can be
completely offset by discretionary monetary policy under perfect information, this "divine coinci-
dence" cannot be achieved in the presence of informational frictions. This is because even if the
actual shock is a natural-rate shock, the private sector still assigns a positive possibility to the event
that the interest rate is reacting to a cost-push shock. Consequently, optimizing discretionary pol-
icy is "leaning against the wind" after both shocks, seeking a negative correlation between output
gap and inflation. I show that the optimizing discretionary interest rate reacts more to natural-rate
shocks and less to cost-push shocks than what is optimal under perfect information.
In addition, I extend the analysis to serially correlated shocks to study the dynamic informa-
tional effect of the interest rate. In this case, the dynamic informational effect of the current interest
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rate comes from the persistent belief-formation process in the private sector. The private agents
forms beliefs in the current period by optimally combining current signals and past beliefs. Con-
sequently, the current interest rate has a lagged effect on future equilibrium through its effect on
current beliefs. When the central bank considers the dynamic effect of its interest rate decisions,
the objective function of a discretionary central bank includes deviations of the output gap and in-
flation in both current and future periods. The optimal discretionary policy can be characterized as
"dynamically leaning against the wind": it is willing to tolerate a positive sum of current inflation
and the current output gap if the sum of inflation and the output gap in the future is expected to be
negative.
On the quantitative aspects, I compare the equilibrium dynamics using a calibrated model with
the case under perfect information. I find that the impulse responses after a natural-rate shock
are similar under perfect information and under imperfect information, but the dynamics after a
cost-push shock are very different: inflation is largely reduced under imperfect information and
the sacrifice in the output gap is also reduced at the same time. This is because as the equilibrium
interest rate responds more aggressively to natural-rate shocks and less aggressively to cost-push
shocks, the updates in the expected cost push shock is very small under imperfect information,
which makes the actual inflation smaller, compared with the response under perfect information.
Consequently, the informational effect of interest rate is beneficial, as the central bank does not
need to tighten monetary policy to dampen consumption by the amount that it does under perfect
information.
Related Literature
This chapter connects the theoretical studies on the optimal monetary policy under informational
frictions and the empirical studies on the informational effect of interest rates.
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On the theoretical side, this field is revived by Woodford (2001), which shows how higher order
beliefs lead to a persistent effect of monetary policy, under the assumption of imperfect information
which was initially introduced in Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972).
The majority of papers that study optimal monetary policy under informational frictions as-
sume that beliefs in the private sector are formed independently from monetary policy decisions.
Under this assumption, a central bank makes policy decisions every period, taking as given the
exogenous beliefs in the private sector. Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) assume that information
is rigid in the private sector and characterize optimal policy as an elastic price standard. Adam
(2007) assumes an endogenous learning process in the private sector and demonstrates that the
target of the optimal monetary policy changes from output gap stabilization to price stabilization
when information becomes more precise. Angeletos and La’O (2011) solve the Ramsey problem
for optimal monetary policy and show that the flexible-price equilibrium is no longer the first-best
when information frictions affect real variables.
Recent papers have begun to investigate the situation in which the private sector extracts in-
formation about the underlying economy from monetary policy decisions. Baeriswyl and Cornand
(2010) note that because monetary policy cannot fully neutralize markup shocks, the central bank
alters its policy response to reduce the information revealed about the cost push shock through
monetary policy. Berkelmans (2011) demonstrates that with multiple shocks, tightening policy
may initially increase inflation. The paper most related to the present work is Tang (2013), which
shows that when the private sector has rational expectations, the stabilization bias is reduced when
monetary policy has an information effect.
On the empirical side, Romer and Romer (2000) and Romer and Romer (2004) are the first con-
tributions to provide empirical evidence on information asymmetry between the Federal Reserve
and the private sector. They show that inflation forecasts by private agents respond to changes in
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the policy-rate after FOMC announcements. Faust, Swanson and Wright (2004) further confirm
that the private sector revises its forecasts in response to monetary policy surprises. In more recent
papers, Campbell et al. (2012) show that unemployment forecasts decrease and CPI inflation fore-
casts increase after a positive innovation to future federal funds rates. Nakamura and Steinsson
(2013) identify the informational effect of the federal funds rate suing high-frequency data. In
addition, Melosi (2016) captures this empirical pattern using a DSGE model with dispersed infor-
mation. Garcia-Schmidt (2015) uses Brazilian Survey data to show that inflation forecasts in the
private sector increase in the short run after an unexpected tightening policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the optimization
decisions by the representative household in the private sector, and expresses aggregate output
gap and inflation as functions of beliefs. Section 3 analyzes optimizing discretionary policy and
gains from commitment to policy rule in the baseline case where shocks are not serially correlated.
Section 4 and section 5 discuss two factors that affect the size of gains from commitment: external
information and serial correlation in shocks. To quantitatively assess the gains from commitment,
I calibrate the full version of my model with serially correlated shocks, external signals and policy
implementation error in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
1.2 Private Sector
In this section, I incorporate informational frictions to an otherwise standard New Keynesian model
with Calvo-type price rigidity. Fluctuations are driven by two types of shocks: a technology shock
(expressed in terms of the "Wicksellian natural rate" in the output gap) and a wage markup shock
(expressed in terms of a cost push shock in inflation). I assume that the central bank has perfect
information about the two shocks, whereas the private sector cannot directly observe the shocks.
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The private sector has rational expectations about the central bank’s behavior. In particular, the
private sector correctly understands how the central bank will respond to both shocks and infers
information about the shocks from observing the interest rate decision. This section describes the
equilibrium level of the aggregate output gap and inflation as functions of beliefs in the private
sector.
1.2.1 Informational Frictions
Following Phelps (1970), Woodford (2001), and Angeletos and La’O (2010), I model an "island
economy", in which the informational frictions are resulted from geographical isolation. There is
a continuum of islands, indexed by j, and a representative household. The household consists of
a consumer and a continuum of workers. At the beginning of each period, the household sends
one worker to each island, j. There is a continuum of monopolistic firms, each located on one
island and indexed by the island. Each firm demands labor in the local labor market in the island
and produces a differentiated intermediate good, j. Information is symmetric within an island, as
each firm is able to observe its firm-specific shocks. Information is asymmetric across islands, as
firms are unable to observe shocks or decisions made by other firms. Consequently, the resetting
price of each firm depends on the firm’s expectation of the aggregate price level, which makes
aggregate inflation a function of beliefs in the private sector. The consumer of the representative
household makes inter-temporal consumption decisions. He is able to observe the current prices
of all intermediate goods, but unable to directly observe shocks. Consequently, the inter-temporal
consumption decisions are also subject to informational frictions.
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1.2.2 Private Sector Optimization Problems
Household
The preferences of the representative household are defined over the aggregate consumption good,








V (Nt( j))d j
}
, (1.1)
where EHt denotes the household’s subjective expectations conditional on its information set, ωH .










where Ct( j) is the consumption of intermediate good j in period t.
The economy is cashless. The household maximizes expected utility subject to the inter-
temporal budget constraint:
∫
Pt( j)Ct( j)d j+Bt+1 ≤
∫
Wt( j)Nt( j)d j+(1+ it)Bt +Πt , (1.3)
where Bt is a risk-free bond with nominal interest it , which is determined by the central bank. Πt
is the lump-sum component of household income, which includes tax payments and profits from
all firms. Wt( j) and Nt( j) are the labor wage and labor supply for firm j, respectively.
The household’s optimization problem can be solved in two stages. First, conditional on the
level of aggregate consumption, the household allocates intermediate goods consumption to mini-
mize the cost of expenditure conditional on the level of aggregate good consumption. The alloca-
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In the second stage, given the aggregate price level, Pt , the household chooses its aggregate
consumption, Ct , labor supply to all firms, Nt( j) ∀ j, and savings in the risk-free bond, Bt+1. I
assume that the utility of aggregate good consumption and the utility of labor supply take the
following forms: U(Ct) =
C1−σt
1−σ , and V (N jt) =
N1+ϕjt
1−ϕ , where σ is the inverse of the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution and the parameter ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The inter-temporal consumption decision leads to the following Euler equation:









Equation (1.5) shows that consumption decisions are forward-looking. Current demand depends
the relative cost of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow.
The intra-temporal labor supply decision sets the marginal rate of substitution between leisure








Firms make two decisions to maximize expected profits: the intra-period cost minimization and
the optimal pricing decisions. As the cost minimization problem only involves information within
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the island and information is symmetric within islands, the intra-period cost minimization problem
is free from any informational frictions. The optimal pricing decision, by contrast, is affected by
both the Calvo price rigidity and the informational frictions. In each period, a measure 1− θ of
firms get the Calvo lottery to reset their prices. Other firms charge their previous prices. A firm
j that resets its price in period t chooses P∗t ( j) to maximize its own expectation of the sum of all









P∗t ( j)Yt+k( j)−Uwt+k( j)Wt+k( j)Nt( j)
]}
, (1.7)
where E jt denotes firm j’s expectation conditional on its information set, ω j. Qt,t+k is the stochastic





. Uwt+k( j) denotes the wage markup for firm j.
Firms face two constraints. The first is the demand for their products, which results from the
household’s optimal allocation among intermediate goods. The second constraint is the production
technology. Following the tradition of New Keynesian literature, I assume that labor is the only
input and each firm produces according to a constant return to scale technology,
Yt( j) = At( j)Lt( j), (1.8)
where At( j) denotes the technology of firm j.
There are two sources of uncertainty that affect the pricing decisions of each firm: technology
shocks and wage markup shocks. I assume that both shocks have an aggregate component and an
idiosyncratic component. The idiosyncratic components are drawn independently in every period,
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and are distributed log-normally around their aggregate components.
log(At( j))≡ at( j) = at + sat ( j), sat ( j)∼ N(0, σ2sa)
log(Uwt ( j))≡ uwt ( j) = uwt + sut ( j), sut ( j)∼ N(0, σ2su)
I assume that the aggregate components of both shocks follow AR(1) processes:
at = φaat−1+ vat , v
a






t ∼ N(0, σ2vuw)
The first order condition for labor input implies that the nominal marginal cost of production is
Ut( j)Wt( j)/At( j). Substituting the marginal cost of production into the optimal pricing decision
results in






E jt Σ(βθ)ku′(Ct+k)Pε−1t+k Yt+k
. (1.9)
Equation (1.9) implies that individual resetting prices are forward-looking and strategic comple-
ments. The optimal resetting price of firm j increases with the expectation of a higher firm-specific
marginal cost of production and a higher aggregate price level in both the current and all future
periods.
1.2.3 Aggregation and Equilibrium in the Private Sector
Equilibrium variables in the private sector are solved in log deviations from steady state values
(i.e., xt ≡ ln(Xt/X)), and denoted by lower-case letters. (See Appendix A. 1 for details.)
The Output Gap
Following the New Keynesian tradition, I express output in terms of the output gap, yˆt , which is
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defined as the difference between yt and the natural level of output, ynt . The natural level of output
is defined as the output level under flexible prices and perfect information. In this situation, ynt
becomes a linear function of at ynt =
ϕ+σ
1+ϕ at , and follows an AR(1) process, y
n
t = φynt−1+vt , where
φ = φa, and σv = ϕ+σ1+ϕ σva.
The output gap is derived as follows:




















where EHt yˆt+1 = E
H
t yt+1−EHt ynt+1 = EHt yt+1− φEHt ynt . rnt denotes the natural rate of interest,
which is the equilibrium real interest rate that equates output to its natural level under perfect
information and flexible prices. It is calculated as rnt ≡ σ (Etyt+1− ynt ) = σ(φ −1)ynt .3




t , and expectations about future equilibrium are objective i.
e., EHt yˆt+1 = Et yˆt+1 and E
H
t pit+1 = Etpit+1. Substituting them into the above equation results in the
IS curve under perfect information:
yˆt = Est yˆt−
1
σ
[it− rnt −Etpit+1] (1.11)
The difference between equation (1.10) with equation (1.11) illustrates how the output gap
under imperfect information differs from that under perfect information. Specifically, under perfect
information, a positive natural-rate shock increases the output gap by 1σ r
n
t . The positive output gap
is caused by the price rigidity, as the adjustments in prices are insufficient, so that the reduction
in the equilibrium output is smaller than the reduction in the natural output. In comparison, this
3The natural rate shock is mapped from the aggregate component in firm technology shocks in the present model,
but it can also be other types of demand shocks as well, for example time preference shocks or government spending
shocks. As long as the output target in the next period is not known for the household, the expected natural rate affect
the output gap in addition to the actual one.
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output gap is enlarged under imperfect information. Absent an interest rate response, the private
agents do not update their beliefs about the natural rate. Substituting Est r
n
t = 0 into equation (1.10)




t . Intuitively, as the household does not know about
the change in the natural output level in the next period, the household does not reduce current
consumption, which is equivalent to a larger positive output gap.
Inflation
According to the assumption of Calvo-type price rigidity, the current aggregate price level is
the composite of the aggregate price in the previous period and the average resetting prices:
pt = θ pt−1+(1−θ)
∫
p∗t ( j)d j. (1.12)
The integral of resetting prices potentially leads to the higher order beliefs problem. As equa-
tion (1.9) shows, p∗t ( j) includes firm j’s expectation about the aggregate price level Pt , and, thus,
includes other firms’ expectations. This leads to the infinite regress problem, in which each firm
uses its firm-specific shock as a private signal, and guesses the private signals observed by other
firms. As the focus of my study is on aggregate variables instead of on the distribution of prices
across firms, I abstract from this higher order beliefs problem by modeling homogeneous subjec-
tive beliefs.4 This means that when all private agents, including both firms and the household,
form expectations about the aggregate variables, all agents use only public signals. Therefore, the
information sets are the same across all agents. I denote the homogeneous subjective beliefs in the
private sector as Est .
5 Mathematically, I assume that the idiosyncratic components of firm-specific
shocks have infinite variance. In this case, private signals are completely uninformative, so that
4There are many papers that address how higher order beliefs lead to monetary policy to have more persistent
effects, for example Woodford (2001) and Angeletos and La’O (2009). For the solution method to the infinite regress
problem, see Huo and Takayama (2015), Melosi (2016) and Nimark (2017).
5Note that subjective expectations in this paper refer to the rational expectations formed as a result of imperfect
information about the state variables.
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firms do not use their private signals about firm-specific shocks to form beliefs about aggregate
variables.6
The aggregation of individual resetting prices leads to the New Keynesian Phillips curve under
subjective beliefs: (see Appendix A.2 for the detailed derivation.)
pit = βθEst pit+1+(1−θ)Est pit +κθ yˆt +ut , (1.13)
where κ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)(ϕ+σ)θ , and ut denotes the cost push shock, which is related to the wage
markup shock as ut = (1−θ)(1−βθ)uwt .
If information is perfect, expected inflation is the same as actual inflation, i.e., Est pit = pit , and
expectations about future equilibrium are objective i.e., Est pit+1 = Etpit+1. Substituting them into
equation (1.13) results in the Phillips curve under perfect information:




The difference between equation (1.13) and equation (1.14) shows how the inflation under
imperfect information differs from that under perfect information. Under perfect information, a
positive cost-push shock increases inflation by 1θ ut . As this cost-push shock does not increase the
output gap, the central bank faces a conflict between stabilizing inflation and closing the output
gap. If it increases the interest rate to dampen inflation, it also creates a negative output gap.
When information is imperfect, only a fraction θ of the actual cost-push shock is observed by
individual firms, as firms only observe their firm-specific shocks. Absent an interest rate response,
6Another way to generate homogeneous beliefs is to assume that firms have the same technology and face the same
wage markup but do not observe them when setting prices. This assumption, however, implies that aggregate inflation
consists of only the firms’ expectations, and does not consist of actual shocks. Consequently, there will be no trade-off
between inflation and the output gap due to the lack of actual cost-push shocks, which makes the optimal monetary
policy becomes less interesting.
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firms do not update beliefs regarding the aggregate cost-push shock, meaning that the resetting
prices change by less than under perfect information. Therefore, imperfect information reduces
the stabilization bias under perfect information.
1.3 Monetary Policy with Serially Uncorrelated Shocks
I start the analysis of discretionary monetary policy with informational effect from a simple sce-
nario, in which underlying shocks have no serial correlation. In this case, although private agents
are forward-looking, the expectations of future equilibrium variables do not matter for current
choices, as future equilibrium variables are expected to be at their steady state levels.
1.3.1 The Informational Effect of Interest Rates
This section uses an arbitrary interest rate response function to illustrate the two effects that interest
rates have: the direct effect on the borrowing cost and the informational effect on beliefs in the
private sector. It emphasizes how the informational effect on beliefs about different shocks are
determined by the interest rate reaction function.
First, since shocks have no correlation, substituting φ = 0 and Est yˆt+1 = Est pit+1 = 0 in the IS
function and the Phillips curve results in:7
yˆt =− 1σ (it− r
n
t ) (1.15)
pit = (1−θ)Est pit +κθ yˆt +ut (1.16)
As shown in the IS equation, the output gap is free from subjective beliefs and thus the informa-
7Following the conventional New Keynesian literature, the long-run distortion has been eliminated via Pigouvian
tax as an employment subsidy, so that the steady state levels of the output gap and inflation are all zero.
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tional effect of the interest rate does not play a role in determining the output gap. This is because
future equilibrium variables are expected to be at steady state levels and the current aggregate price
level is observed by the consumer.
In contrast, inflation is affected by subjective beliefs, as individual firms do not observe the
aggregate price level when setting optimal prices. Consequently, to express actual inflation in
terms of shocks, further substitute the expected aggregate inflation by Est pit = κEst yˆt + 1θ E
s
t ut . The
expected output gap is different from the actual output gap, as the private sector has imperfect
knowledge of the actual rnt . Specifically, E
s
t yˆt = yˆt − 1σ rnt + 1σ Est rnt . As a result, inflation can be
expressed in terms of the output gap, the actual shocks and the expected shocks as follows:




t − rnt )+
1−θ
θ
Est ut +ut . (1.17)
The interest rate has two effects on equilibrium in the private sector. The first one is the direct
effect, which is the conventionally studied effect on the borrowing cost for the household. The
direct effect of a marginal increase in the interest rate reduces current consumption, as it increases
the relative cost of current consumption versus future consumption. In addition, the direct effect
of an increase in the interest rate also reduces the aggregate price level, as each firm reduces its
resetting price when facing a lower demand. The direct effect of the interest rate on the output gap
and inflation are as follows:
∂ yˆt
∂ it
|direct =− 1σ ,
∂pit
∂ it






The informational effect captures how the interest rate changes the beliefs in the private sector




t ut . As the output gap is not affected by the subjective
beliefs, it is free from the informational effect of the interest rate. The marginal informational
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effect of the interest rate on inflation is the combination of the marginal change in the expected
cost-push shock and in the expected natural-rate shock. The marginal informational effect of the
interest rate on output gap and inflation is
∂ yˆt
∂ it











where the partial derivatives of inflation on the expected natural-rate and the expected cost-push













To study the informational effect of the interest rate, one first needs to specify the (unobserved)
state variables and the signals about the state variables. As shown in the IS curve and the Phillips
curve, only the aggregate part of the shocks matter in determining the output gap and inflation.
In addition, technology shocks and wage markup shocks can be written in terms of natural-rate




ut = φuut−1+ vut ,
where the natural-rate shock and the cost-push shock are mapped from the technology shock and
the wage markup shock as rnt =
ϕ+σ
1+ϕ σ(φ −1)at , and ut = (1−θ)(1−βθ)uwt .
Denote the auto-coefficients of the natural-rate shock and the cost-push shock as φ and φu. By
construction, they are the same as the auto-coefficients of the aggregate technology process and
the wage markup process. In this section, I assume that the two shocks are serially uncorrelated.
(φ = φu = 0) Denote the standard deviation of the natural-rate shock and the cost-push shock as
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σr and σu. By construction, σr = ϕ+σ1+ϕ σ(φ −1)σva, and σu = (1−θ)(1−βθ)σvuw
I assume that private agents have rational expectations regarding the interest rate response func-
tion. Under an arbitrary linear interest rate function which responds linearly to the two aggregate
shocks, i.e., it = Frrnt +Fuut , the interest rate becomes one signal that simultaneously provides
information about two shocks.
If there is only one shock to which the interest rate responds linearly, the private sector will be
able to perfectly infer the actual shock. In this case, the economy becomes identical to the perfect
information case.8 In the case with two shocks, when private agents regard the interest rate as a
signal about one shock, the prior distribution of the other shock becomes the source of noise in this
signal.
Belief Formation
Agents in the private sector are Bayesian, and form best linear forecasts by optimally weighting
their prior beliefs (shocks have zero ex-ante mean) and the current signal (the interest rate). Let Kr
and Ku denote the optimal weights on the two states after observing interest rate changes, which
are determined through the optimal filtering process. Beliefs formed about the two states obtained



















8Another way to maintain imperfect information while having only one state variable is to include an implementa-
tion error in the interest rate, meaning the interest rate becomes a noisy signal. In Section 6 where I quantitative assess









F2r σ2r +F2u σ2u
.
Equation (1.18) shows that in the solution of the Kalman filtering process with an arbitrary
interest rate reaction function, the sensitivity of beliefs to the actual shock is the product of the
sensitivity of beliefs to the interest rate (Kr or Ku) and the sensitivity of the interest rate to the
actual shocks, (Fr or Fu). The following lemma provides an interpretation of equation (1.18).
Lemma 1: Beliefs are more sensitive to the shock (1) to which the interest rate responds more
aggressively, and (2) that has higher ex-ante dispersion.
Lemma 1 describes, for a given ex-ante dispersion of the shocks, how the precision of the
interest rate as a signal is determined by the interest rate response function of the two shocks.
Private agents in the private sector do not know whether a changes in interest rate responds to
the natural rate shock or to the cost push shock. They believe that the interest rate is more likely
to respond to the shock to which it is more sensitive. For example, if the interest rate barely
responds to cost-push shocks, then after observing a change in the interest rate, agents in the
private sector infer that the change in the interest rate is less likely to be a response to a cost-push
shock. Otherwise, provided that Fu is very small, the change in the interest rate has to come from
a large cost-push shock, which is less likely to realize given the prior distribution of the cost-push
shock. However, for any given interest rate reaction function, agents in the private sector update
more toward the shock that has higher ex-ante dispersion, as the ex-ante mean of the shock has a
smaller weight in belief-formation process.
Notice the difference between the sensitivity of beliefs to actual shocks and the sensitivity of
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beliefs to the interest rate. I illustrate the difference in the following figure. In this figure, I first
hold σr = σu = 0.1, and illustrate the change in the sensitivity of the expected cost-push shock to
the interest rate (Ku) and the sensitivity of the expected cost-push shock to the actual shock (KrFr)
while holding Fr fixed at 1.5. Lemma 1 suggests that for a given Fr, the sensitivity of the expected
cost-push shock to the actual cost-push shock, ∂E
s
t ut
∂ut (KuFu), increases as Fu increases, but it is not




Figure 1.1: The Sensitivity of Expected Shocks to Interest Rates and to Actual Shocks
In the first row, Fr is fixed at 1.5, and σr = σu = 0.1. When Fu increases from 0.1 to 3, KuFu (right
figure) increases monotonically. However, as shown in the left figure, Ku increases first, but then
decreases at larger value of Fu. In the second row, I hold Fr = Fu = 2, and σr = 0.1. Increasing σu
monotonically increases both the sensitivity of beliefs to interest rate and the sensitivity of beliefs
(left figure) to the actual shock (right figure).
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The above figure shows that when Fu begins to increase from a small value, both the sensitivity
of beliefs to interest rate and the sensitivity of beliefs to the actual shock increases. However, as Fu
becomes larger, the change in the informational effect is dominated by the interest rate becoming
more sensitive to shocks rather than beliefs being more sensitive to interest rate changes. As shown
in the left figure in the first row, the sensitivity of Est ut to the change in it decreases at higher level
of Fu. Next, in the second row, I fix Fr = Fu = 2, and σr = 0.1, and analyze changes in σu from
0.01 to 1. Both the sensitivity of beliefs to interest rate and to the actual shock increases.
1.3.2 The Optimization Problem of the Central Bank
In the previous section, I analyzed the informational effect for a given interest rate rule. Here, I
analyze the equilibrium between the private sector and the central bank in which the central bank
optimizes in a discretionary way. Specifically, the central bank sets the interest rate to maximize its
objective at any given state, taking as given the informational effect of the interest rate. The private
sector has rational expectations, in the sense that it perfectly understands the best response function
of the interest rate, and extracts information about the current states through the optimal filtering
process. Simultaneously, the household chooses consumption and firms optimally set prices.
The optimizing interest rate is an endogenous decision by the central bank, whose objective
function consists of equilibrium variables in the private sector. The equilibrium variables in the
private sector depend on the beliefs in the private sector, which in turn depend on the equilibrium
interest rate reaction function. This introduces circularity into the belief-formation problem. The
solution of this problem is discussed by Svensson and Woodford (2003). Following their method,
I study the equilibrium interest rate of an optimizing discretionary central bank by first conjectur-
ing an interest rate reaction function, with which private agents form beliefs. Next, I derive the
constraint faced by the central bank, which is the Phillips curve under imperfect information, and
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solve for the equilibrium interest rate decision under this constraint. Finally, I find the fixed point
solution such that the equilibrium response of the interest rate is consistent with the previously
conjectured interest rate reaction function.
The Phillips Curve
I begin the analysis of the discretionary monetary policy by discussing the constraint faced by the
central bank, which is the Phillips curve. The Phillips curve captures the trade-off between output
gap stabilization and inflation stabilization, as the interest rate changes both the output gap and
inflation. With perfect information, the slope of the Phillips curve is exogenous to the interest rate
decision. Moreover, with perfect information, the Phillips curve crosses the origin of the (yˆt , pit)
plane after a natural-rate shock and has a positive intercept after a cost-push shock.
However, with imperfect information, the Phillips curve depends not only on the realization of
actual shocks, but also on the expectations about the shocks. As the expectations about the two
shocks are determined by the reaction function of the interest rate, I first guess and then verify that
in equilibrium, the interest rate is linear in the two aggregate state variables: it = Frrnt +Fuut . Then,
I substitute the expected shocks under this interest rate reaction function, to solve for the Phillips
curve with the informational effect of the interest rate:











t +ut . (1.19)
To express the trade-off between output gap stabilization and inflation stabilization, I substitute
interest rate by its relation with output gap from the IS equation, it =−σ yˆt + rnt . This results in the
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where Kr and Ku are determined through the optimal filtering process in equation (1.18).
The following lemma summarizes the differences between the Phillips curve under perfect
information and the Phillips curve under imperfect information.
Lemma 2: For a given interest rate function that reacts to both shocks in a linear way, the
informational effect of the interest rate changes the Phillips curve in three aspects, relative to the
Phillips curve under perfect information:
1. The slope of the Phillips curve is flatter than that under perfect information.
2. The intercept after a cost push shock is reduced.
3. There is non-zero intercept after a natural rate shock.
Proof: see Appendix A.4
The intuition follows:
For (1), the slope captures the co-movement between the output gap and inflation due to
changes in the interest rate. The informational effect of the interest rate on inflation reduces the
co-movement between the output gap and inflation. After a tightening monetary policy, the direct
effect of the interest rate reduces the output gap, as the higher nominal interest rate increases the
real cost of borrowing. Under perfect information, the direct effect on inflation is given by κ ,
but under imperfect information, this direct effect is dampened by the informational effect. When
observing a higher interest rate, private agents assign a positive possibility to the event that the
interest rate is reacting to a positive cost-push shock. This update in the expected cost-push shock
leads to an increase in expected inflation. This update of beliefs reduces the direct tightening ef-
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fect of the interest rate on inflation, which reduces the co-movement between the output gap and
inflation.
For (2), the intercept caused by an actual cost-push shock is reduced because information on
the actual cost-push shocks is only partially revealed through the interest rate. Note that although
both the actual cost-push shock and the expected cost-push shock induce an increase in inflation,
the expected cost-push shock does not cause an intercept. This is because when the interest rate
does not change, meaning the output gap stays at zero after in absence of natural rate shock, the
private agents do not update expected cost-push shock. In fact, the effect of an expected cost push
shock is captured in the slope, rather than the intercept, of the Phillips curve.
For (3), after a positive natural-rate shock, the intercept of the Phillips curve represents the
equilibrium output gap and inflation when when the interest rate tracks the natural rate one-to-one,
it = rnt . Due to the informational effect of the interest rate, the change in the interest rate makes the
private agents simultaneously update beliefs about both shocks. Therefore, inflation changes, with
the sign depending on the expected cost-push shock and the difference between the expected and
the actual natural-rate shock. First, the expected cost-push shocks increase inflation, because each
firm believes the aggregate price level increases, when other firms all have higher wage markups.
Second, as the private agents underestimate the realization of the natural-rate shock, each firm
expects aggregate demand to be less than the actual level. Consequently, the negative difference
between the expected and the actual natural-rate shock decreases inflation. The relative size of the
two effects determines the sign of the intercept.
I plot the Phillips curve under imperfect information, in comparison with the Phillips curve
under perfect information in Figure 1.2.9
9see Section 1.4.3 for parameter values
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Figure 1.2: The Phillips Curve under Discretionary Monetary Policy
In the above figures, I plot the Phillips curve under discretionary policy while fixing the interest
rate reaction function to be Fr = 1 and Fu = 1. The prior distribution of the two shocks are set
equal, σr = σu = 0.1.
27
The Equilibrium Interest Rate
When shocks are serially uncorrelated and the interest rate does not respond to lagged variables,
the current interest rate does not affect the future output gap or inflation. Thus, when choosing the
current interest rate, although the central bank is forward-looking, it only considers the effect on
current inflation and the output gap when making current interest rate decision. The optimization









+ indept. terms (1.21)
subject to
yˆt =− 1σ (it− r
n
t ) (1.22)










t = Krit (1.24)
Est ut = Kuit (1.25)
where ω is a constant that results from the second-order approximation of the household’s utility.10
Definition: A Markov perfect equilibrium between a discretionary central bank and the private
sector with rational expectations can be described in aggregate terms in the following way:
(i) Inflation and the output gap result from the household’s optimal consumption choices and
firms’ optimal price-setting behavior, which are shown in equations (1.10) and (1.13).
(ii) Beliefs in the private sector about the realization of shocks are formed through the Kalman
10see Woodford (2011) for general derivation of the second-order approximation of the household’s utility under
perfect information, and Adam (2007) for the application to imperfect information. See Appendix for the derivations
that apply to the specific assumptions in this paper.
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Filtering process as shown in equation (1.18);
(iii) The interest rate is set by the central bank’s constrained optimization problem as specified
in (1.21).
To solve for the equilibrium interest rate, we first need to conjecture an interest rate reaction




u ut , which determines the Phillips curve. Then, the central bank chooses
the interest rate to maximize its objective function under the constraint of the Phillips curve. The
equilibrium interest rate under rational expectations is found as the fixed point between the conjec-
tured interest rate function and the optimizing interest rate solution. I analyze the characteristics
of the optimizing discretionary interest rate in the rest of this section.11







ω yˆt ≡=−Ryˆt . (1.26)
Lemma 3: When shocks are serially uncorrelated, discretionary monetary policy seeks a neg-
ative correlation between the current output gap and inflation after both natural-rate shocks and
cost-push shocks. The absolute value of the correlation coefficient is greater than that under full
information.
The intuition of this result is as follows: As the intercept is generally not zero after both shocks
(Lemma 2), the interest rate increases after positive realizations of both shocks. As the optimizing
central bank chooses the tangent point between its indifference curve L(yˆt ,pit) and the Phillips
curve, the equilibrium (yˆ∗t , pˆi∗t ) vector is orthogonal to the Phillips curve. As the Phillips curve has
a smaller slope under the informational effect, the resulting vector of (pi∗t , yˆ∗t ) becomes steeper.
More explicitly, under full information, the absolute value of the correlation between output
11A detailed derivation for solving for the equilibrium optimizing interest rate is provided in Appendix.
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gap and inflation is















With information frictions, the marginal effect of the interest rate on inflation is dampened by
the informational effect, and thus





















Under usual parameter values, the interest rate responds positively to both shocks, i.e., Fr > 0,
Fu > 0. Therefore, the Kalman gains are positive, Kr > 0, Ku > 0, which results in Rimper f ect in f o >
Rper f ect in f o.
We now turn to finding the equilibrium interest rate that achieves the target characterized in
Lemma 3.
First, recall that the equilibrium interest rate tracks one-to-one with the change in natural rate,
as doing so completely closes the output gap and stabilizes inflation. The optimal response to
cost-push shock is "leaning against the wind", which results in pit =−ωκ yˆt .
Denote the equilibrium interest rate under discretionary central bank and perfect information




u ut , where










Denote the equilibrium interest rate of discretionary monetary policy under imperfect information




u ut . The following assumptions help me compare the equilibrium discretionary
interest rate under imperfect information and under perfect information.
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Assumption 1: (1− θ) κσ (Kr(F pr , F pu )− 1)+ 1−θθ Ku(F pr , F pu ) > 1, where Kr and Ku denote
the Kalman gains from updating beliefs about the expected natural-rate and cost-push shock as
specified in equation (1.18).
Assumption 2: Rp > R¯, where Rp represents the absolute value of the correlation between the
output gap and inflation, which is given by equation (1.27).12
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium discretionary interest rate reacts
more aggressively to natural-rate shocks and less aggressively to cost-push shocks under imperfect








Proof: see the Appendix A.4
Assumption 1 guarantees that under imperfect information, when the central bank implements(




, the Phillips curve has a positive intercept after a natural-rate shock. In this situation, as
suggested by Lemma 3, the discretionary central bank should increase the interest rate to achieve
a negative output gap, which is equivalent to an Fdr that is greater than F
p
r .
Two factors drive the change in the optimal response to cost-push shocks under imperfect
information, as the informational effect changes both the slope and the intercept of the Phillips
curve. First, as suggested by Lemma 2, after a cost-push shock, the intercept decreases from
1
θ ut under perfect information to ut under imperfect information. Holing the slope constant, this
reduction proportionally reduces the decrease in the equilibrium output gap and the equilibrium
response of the interest rate. Second, holding the intercept fixed, Assumption 2 dictates that the
change in the slope also results in an increase in the equilibrium output gap. Therefore, the two





12See the Appendix A.4 for specific expression for R¯
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1.4 Dynamic Informational Effect
I extend the analysis to the dynamic informational effect of the interest rate by introducing serially
correlated shocks. Since the consumption and pricing decisions are both forward-looking, the
expectations about the future states matter for current output gap and inflation. When shocks have
serial correlation, current interest rates also affect expectations about future shocks, which leads to
the dynamic informational effect of interest rates.
1.4.1 States, Beliefs and the Equilibrium in Private Sector
To analyze the direct informational effect of interest rates, I first study the dynamic learning process
in the private sector.
State

















The information set of the private sector includes the values of all parameters and the entire
history of interest rates upon t. I first conjecture and then show that the equilibrium interest rate
becomes a function of the state variables in period t, which includes both the actual shocks at time
t and beliefs in period t−1.








The inertial components in the equilibrium interest rate comes from the persistent belief up-
dating process. As the private sector optimally weights the signals in the current period and the
beliefs in the last period to form current expectations, the current output gap and inflation become
functions of past beliefs. Therefore, when a discretionary central bank sets the current interest rate
to minimize deviations of the current output gap and inflation, the interest rate in equilibrium also
reacts to beliefs in the past period.
As the private agents have perfect memory of their beliefs in the past, they are able to distin-
guish the fraction of the interest rate that reacts to current shocks from the fraction of the interest
rate that reacts to past beliefs. Let iˆt denote the fraction of it that reacts to current shocks, which
follows:
iˆt ≡ it−F3Est−1rnt−1−F4Est−1ut−1 = F1rnt +F3ut . (1.31)
Belief Formation
The private sector forms expectations about current states through the Kalman filtering process.
Denote the hidden state variables as
zt =Φzt−1+ vt (1.32)




, and vt = [vrt , vut ]′ with white noise of variance Q.
Denote the observable signal as
st = Dzt (1.33)
where st = it , and D = [F1,F3]
′.
The Kalman filtering process makes beliefs about the current state variables be the optimal











where the optimal weight, K, is determined by Ricatti iteration




Solution in the Private Sector under Arbitrary Policy Coefficients
The equilibrium in the private sector is described by the system of equations summarizing
private sector optimization decisions in aggregate variables (equations 1.10 and 1.12), the evolution
of shocks (equation 1.29), the interest rate reaction function (equation 1.30), and belief updating
process characterized in equation (1.34).
Since the equilibrium involves forward-looking variables, I solve for it by the undetermined
coefficients method. I first conjecture that yˆt and pit are linear functions of the state variables in
period t, that is,
[
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This conjecture allows for the expression of expected future equilibrium variables in terms of
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γ1φ + γ2 γ3φu+ γ4





Substituting these into the the IS and the Phillips curve results in expressions of yˆt and pit as






t ut ]. Applying the belief-updating pro-
cess yields the expressions as functions that consist only of predetermined states. (See Appendix
A.3 for the detailed derivation.)
1.4.2 Discretionary Monetary Policy
A discretionary central bank minimizes the expected output gap and inflation deviations in all
periods. The central bank’s optimization problem can be written as follows:
EtL(t) = Et [pi2t +ω yˆ
2
t ]+βEt(L(t+1)) (1.39)
where the output gap follows equation (1.10), inflation follows equation (1.12), the actual shocks
evolve following equation (1.29), and beliefs are formed using Kalman filtering process specified
in equations (1.34 - 1.36).
Et denotes the objective expectation. The information set of the central bank at t includes the
entire history of natural-rate and cost-push shocks upon t and the beliefs formed in the private
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Et(L(t + 1)) includes the deviations of equilibrium inflation and the output gap in all future
periods:
























When there is serial correlation in shocks, the interest rate has a dynamic informational effect
due to the persistent learning process in the private sector. Consequently, this dynamic informa-
tional effect changes the objective function of a discretionary central bank.13
Lemma 4 With dynamic informational effect, the optimizing discretionary monetary policy is
dynamically "leaning against the wind" as it targets a negative correlation between current and
future deviations of the output gap and inflation.






















To see that the right-hand side is non-zero, we need to first specify how future equilibrium
is affected by current beliefs, and how the current interest rate affects current beliefs. Denote









]′. Due to the projected
linear relationship, the objective expectation of the inflation and the output gap in j periods ahead
13As long as there are shocks that the central bank is unable to completely offset, optimal policy can be described as
"leaning against the wind" (or "flexible inflation target policy") - seeking a contemporary negative correlation between
the output gap and inflation. For discussion about the conventional within-period "leaning against" policy that is





γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8
Etzt+ j ≡ ΓEtzt+ j (1.42)
As long as shocks cannot be completely offset by the interest rate, Γ is non-zero.
The evolution of Etzt+ j includes the auto-correlated actual shocks, and the dynamic process of





t +φ (1−K11F1)Est−1rnt−1+K11F3ut−φuK11F3Est−1ut−1 (1.43)
Est ut = K21F1r
n
t −φK21F1Est−1rnt−1+K21F3ut +φu (1−K21F3)Est−1ut−1 (1.44)
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Combine equations (1.42) and (1.45) to express the future equilibrium in terms of current
beliefs as follows: Etpit+ j
Et yˆt+ j
= ΓΛ j−1Etzt (1.46)
Substituting this expression into the central bank’s objective function transforms the objective
function into a weighted sum of current inflation, the current output gap and the persistent state
variables which include the current actual shocks and current beliefs. The first-order condition on
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j∆( j−1) = 0 (1.47)
where ∆ captures how the current interest rate affects future deviations through its informational





′. (See the Appendix A. 3 for the derivations.)
Proposition 2: With serially correlated shocks, the interest rate in the current period affects
future equilibrium through the dynamic informational effect. The consideration of the dynamic
informational effect makes the equilibrium interest rate target beliefs in addition to targeting the
current inflation and the output gap.
The consideration of the dynamic informational effect consists of two parts. The first part is
captured by the effect on current equilibrium, because both consumption and pricing decisions are
forward-looking. The second part is due to the persistence in the learning process, which is in
addition to stabilizing the current economy. This additional beliefs-targeting does not exist with
serially uncorrelated shocks.
The effects of discretionary policy on future variables are different from the effects on the
actual future variables, as the private sector cannot distinguish the actual shocks from the beliefs.
To see this, use the output gap as an example. First, express the future output gap as the actual















Next, express the expected shocks as the beliefs formed with weights assigned on both past
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The marginal effect of the interest rate on yˆt+1 can then be expressed as the the combination of


























However, the effect of interest rate on the expected future output gap has an additional term, as
the private sector is not able to separate the beliefs from the actual rt+1. The effect of discretionary




























In addition, the effect of discretionary policy on future variables should be distinguished from
the effect of committing to a future interest rate, as the former consists of the informational effect
on the current beliefs, and the latter consists only of the direct effect on future borrowing costs.
Both of the effects are able to influence the current equilibrium when private agents are forward-






14See Appendix A. 3 for expressions of Ξ and Λ
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To solve for the equilibrium interest rate under discretion, I first propose that the interest rate




t−1+F3ut +F4Et−1ut−1, with which the private sector




t ut . The central bank then chooses the interest rate to minimize the
loss function specified in equation (1.39). If the optimizing interest rate is different from the
proposed one, the private sector then changes its beliefs about the interest rate reaction function.
The optimal interest rate is found as the fixed-point solution in this iteration process. Details of
this solution method are provided in Appendix.
The persistence in underlying shocks strengthens the informational effect of interest rate, be-
cause it increases the effect of expected future deviations on current consumption and pricing deci-
sions. If the serial correlation is high enough, it may cause optimal discretionary interest rate to fail
to exist. The intuition is the following. Suppose that the private sector believes the best response
of central bank is to increase the interest rate to the two shocks. If cost push shock is realized to be
positive, which makes the inflation positively deviate from steady-state, the nominal effect of the
interest rate decreases inflation and the informational effect of the interest rate increases inflation.
If the informational effect dominates the direct effect, the inflation increases even further. As a
result, a discretionary central bank wants to choose a negative interest rate, which contradicts the
beliefs in the private sector that the best response of interest rate is to react positively to the two
shocks.
1.4.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I analyze the quantitative aspect of the model using a calibrated dynamic model.
I calibrate the model parameters in line with the convention in the macroeconomics literature.
I set ϕ = 1 and σ = 1, assuming a unitary Frisch elasticity of labor supply and log utility of
consumption. I use β = 0.99, which implies a steady state real return on financial assets of four
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percent. For price rigidity, I calibrate θ , the price stickiness parameter, to be 0.5, which is indicated
by the average price duration from macro and micro empirical evidences.15 For the parameter that
governs the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, I set ε = 4, which implies a
steady state price markup of one-third of revenue.
For the evolution of underlying shocks, I set the auto-correlation of natural-rate shocks to be
0.9, with a standard deviation of 3 percent, as measured by Laubach and Williams (2003). There
is less consensus in the persistence and volatility of cost-push shocks, as they stems from a various
sources. I set the auto-correlation for cost-push shocks to be 0.3 to avoid informational effect of
interest rate being so strong that kills the equilibrium of an optimizing discretionary interest rate.
I set the standard deviation of cost-push shocks to be the same as that of natural-rate shocks. In
addition, I set the standard deviation of policy implementation error to be the same as the standard
deviation of natural rate shock. I assume that there are no external signals apart from the interest
rate. A summary of parameter values in the baseline calibration is provided in the Appendix.
Given these parameter values, I compare the equilibrium interest rate under imperfect informa-
tion and with perfect information.
it = 1.1525rnt −0.1372Est−1rt−1+0.1525ut +0.3464Et−1ut−1, (1.52)
it = 1.0000rnt +2.6490ut . (1.53)
In the following figure, I compare the impulse response after different shocks under perfect
information and under imperfect information.
15Sources:Bils and Klenow (2004), Galı and Gertler (1999), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010)
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Response of Equilibrium Interest Rate, Output Gap and Inflation
In the above figures, parameter values are chosen as φ = 0.9, φu = 0.3, unitary Frisch elasticity of
labor supply and log utility of consumption, i.e., ϕ = 1 and σ = 1. I use θ = 0.5 for price rigidity
and ε = 4 for elasticity of substitution, and discount factor β = 0.99.
42
The above figures show that after a natural rate shock, the equilibrium interest rate, output gap
and inflation are very similar under imperfect information and under perfect information. This is
because the sensitivity of interest-rate to natural rate shocks is much higher than the sensitivity of
interest rate to cost-push shocks, and therefore beliefs after an actual natural-rate shock is close to
the actual shocks. In comparison, the equilibrium after cost-push shocks are significantly.
The response of the interest rate is largely reduced when information is imperfect which con-
sequently reduces the expected inflation. As the actual inflation is partially determined by the
expected inflation, this informational effect reduces equilibrium inflation without the sacrifice of
negative output gap as in the perfect informational case. Lastly, the last row of Figure 1.3 shows
that the effect of positive policy shocks is larger under imperfect information. This is because un-
der imperfect information, the informational effect of interest rates increases the expected natural
rate which is equivalent to a negative shock to the natural level of output. Therefore, the household
reduces consumption and the reduction in aggregate demand brings down inflation.16 The combi-
nation of the informational effect and the direct effect on the cost of borrowing of the household
makes the equilibrium output gap and inflation deviate further away, compared with the case under
perfect information.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I studied an economy in which the private sector has imperfect information about
the underlying shocks and the central bank has perfect information when making interest rate
decisions. In this economy, private agents regard the interest rate as a public signal, and extract
information about the underlying economy from the interest rate decisions by the central bank.
16A positive policy shock also increases the expected cost push shock, which should increases inflation. However
this effect is nominated by the effect on the expected natural rate.
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Consequently, the interest rate has an informational effect in addition to its direct effect on the cost
of borrowing of the household.
I began my analysis by characterizing the equilibrium output gap and inflation in the private
sector. I built a New Keynesian model with both nominal frictions and informational frictions.
There are two types of shocks: aggregate technology shocks and wage markup shocks, both of
which are not directly observed by the private sector.
To study the optimizing response of a discretionary central bank, I started with the simple
scenario in which both shocks are serially uncorrelated, which allowed me to concentrate on the
within-period informational effect of interest rates. Using an arbitrary interest rate function that
responds positively to both shocks, I showed that beliefs in the private sector are more sensitive to
the shock to which the interest rate reacts more aggressively or that has higher ex-ante dispersion.
A discretionary central bank sets interest rates to optimize its objective function at any state of
the economy, taking as given the informational effect of its interest rate decision. I showed that
the informational effect of the interest rate applies differently to the output gap and inflation. Con-
sequently, the informational effect changes the Phillips curve, which captures the co-movements
between the output gap and inflation due to changes in the interest rate. I found that in equilibrium,
the interest rate reacts more aggressively to natural-rate shocks and less aggressively to cost-push
shocks under imperfect information, in comparison to the optimal response of a discretionary cen-
tral bank under perfect information.
Finally, I analyzed the dynamic aspects of the model by allowing serial correlation in shocks.
Due to the serial correlation in shocks, the current interest rate also affects expectations about future
equilibrium through its effect on expectations about current state variables. Using a calibrated
model, I found that the dynamics after natural-rate shocks are similar and the dynamics after cost-
push shocks are very different under imperfect information and under perfect information. This is
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because in equilibrium, the interest rate is more sensitive to natural rate shocks and less sensitive
to cost push shocks. Consequently, after an actual natural rate shock, the expected natural rate
shock is close to the actual one, whereas after a cost push shock, private agents barely update their
expectations on cost push shocks. The dynamics after cost-push shocks show that informational
frictions can potentially improve welfare, as inflation after cost push shocks is reduced without
sacrificing a larger negative output gap. This suggests that if the central bank can control the








Past literature has demonstrated that if the central bank commits to a policy rule, there are gains
from commitment, if beliefs in the private sector are optimally controlled by the central bank.1
However, previous literature has only studied the case in which commitment changes the expec-
tations regarding the policy itself. In this paper, I study the situation in which monetary policy
also conveys information on the realization of shocks in the private sector, and study how gains
from commitment can come from the informational effect of monetary policy. I demonstrate that
the central bank can change how beliefs about different shocks are formed in the private sector by
committing to a state-contingent policy rule, which leads to welfare gains from commitment.
The model of the private agents are the same as the previous chapter: private agents cannot
directly observe shocks and use the interest rate as a public signal to extract information. In this
economy, interest rates have two effects on the equilibrium output gap and inflation: the tradi-
tionally studied direct effect on the borrowing cost of households and the informational effect. In
Chapter 1, the discretionary central bank takes as given the informational effect of the interest
rate. In Chapter 2, I consider the case in which the central bank with commitment can change how
beliefs are formed in the private sector by announcing and committing to a state-contingent rule.
When choosing the ex-ante policy rule, the central bank with commitment internalizes the change
of the informational effect of its interest rate decisions and balances between the direct effect and
the informational effect of the interest rate.
To study how the optimal rule differs from the equilibrium interest rate decision of the discre-
tionary central bank, I start with the simple case in which shocks have no serial correlations. To
isolate the within-period informational gains, I focus on the case in which the interest rate only
1See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Woodford (1999),
Eggertsson et al. (2003), among others. A more comprehensive review on gains from commitment is provided in the
literature review section.
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responds to current shocks. This removes the traditionally studied gains from commitment to a
delayed response, which comes from the change in expected future equilibrium. I show that even
without the traditionally studied effect on the expected future equilibrium, the optimal policy rule
can still improve ex-ante welfare compared with the equilibrium under discretion, as the policy
rule optimally controls the information revealed about the unobserved shocks.
The informational gains from commitment can be analyzed through the change in the Phillips
curve. I demonstrate that relative to the optimizing discretionary interest rate, the optimal inter-
est rate rule responds more aggressively to natural-rate shocks and less aggressively to cost-push
shocks. When the private sector believes that the interest rate is less sensitive to the cost-push
shocks, beliefs about the cost-push shocks are less sensitive to changes in the interest rate. Conse-
quently, both the slope and the intercept of the Phillips curve are endogenously determined by the
policy rule. The optimal policy rule improves ex-ante welfare, because it reduces the sensitivity
of expected cost-push shocks to interest rates, which consequently reduces the stabilization bias
caused by an actual cost-push shock under perfect information.
The informational effect of monetary policy results in a novel time-inconsistency problem. Dif-
ferent from the traditional time inconsistency, in which the incentives to deviate apply across time
periods, the time inconsistency problem in my model applies across states. Once the central bank
has committed to a policy rule, it fixes the informational effect of the interest rate, and thus the
Phillips curve. Ex-post, the central bank has an incentive to deviate from its committed rule, as-
suming that such a change in the interest rate response will not change the Phillips curve. Suppose
that there is a positive natural-rate shock; then, prior to the realization of the shock, the central bank
commits to react more aggressively, relative to the optimizing response under discretion, to reduce
the informational effect on the expected cost-push shock. This policy rule reduces the intercept of
the Phillips curve. Once the Phillips curve is fixed, the central bank wants to reduce the increase
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in the interest rate, as long as such deviation is not anticipated by private agents.
In addition to implementing a state-contingent policy rule, the central bank can also control ex-
pectations in the private sector through direct communication. Direct communication is modeled
as the central bank providing external signals independently around the actual shocks. Without the
informational effect of the interest rate, increasing the precision of the signal about one shock only
makes the expected shock closer to the actual shock ex-ante. However, in the presence of an infor-
mational effect of the interest rate, the effects of external signals are not independent. Increasing
the precision of the external signal about one shock also makes the interest rate a more precise
signal about the other shock. Consequently, this interaction effect yields different welfare impli-
cations for central bank communication than argued by the conventional wisdom. Providing more
precise information about the efficient shock (natural-rate shock) through central bank communi-
cation may reduce welfare if the private sector also simultaneously has more precise information
about the inefficient shock (cost-push shock) from the interest rate.
Moving to the case where shocks have serial correlation, I calibrate the full version of my
model, including external signals, serially correlated shocks, and policy implementation errors. In
my calibrated model, I adopt parameter values from previous macroeconomics studies, except for
the precision of external information. I allow the policy rule to contingent on expectations formed
in the last period. I find that after cost push shocks, the optimal policy rule has inertial components.
The interest rate reacts little in the period where the shock is first realized, and reacts more in the
following periods to the expectations about the cost-push shock. In this case, the gains from com-
mitting to a delayed response reinforce the informational gains from commitment. By reducing the
contemporaneous response to the actual cost-push shock, the central bank reduces the sensitivity
of expected cost-push shocks to interest rates. At the same time, the central bank commits to a
greater tightening monetary policy in following periods, which reduces the expectations in future
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inflation.
Varying the precision of external information critically changes the size of the gains from com-
mitment. In the extreme case in which external information is infinitely imprecise, the gains from
commitment are negligible. However, when external signals are as precise as actual shocks, the
optimal policy rule can improve welfare by 54 percent relative to the equilibrium under optimizing
discretionary policy.
Related Literature
My paper explores the traditionally studied gains from commitment in the context of informational
frictions.
There is a long history of studying the gains from monetary policy commitment. The original
treatments can be found in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), who discuss
the classical inflationary bias that results from a discretionary central bank having an objective
function that contains a positive output gap target. A large literature has developed various methods
to overcome the inflationary bias under discretion, including central bank reputation (Barro (1986)
and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) ect). and different central bank preferences (Rogoff (1985),
Lohmann (1992) and Svensson (1995) etc).
Another mechanism that leads to gains from commitment is when a discretionary central bank
faces stabilization bias. This occurs when there is a trade-off between closing the output gap and
minimizing inflation in the current period. By committing to a delayed interest rate response, the
central bank is able to decrease current inflation without sacrificing the current output gap; instead
it does so through the decrease in expected future inflation. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) study
how an ad-hoc cost-push shock introduces a conflict between inflation stabilization and output gap
stabilization and describe the optimal commitment to a future interest rate path. Woodford (1999)
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studies how an interest rate smoothing objective helps the central bank to commit to a history-
dependent policy, to steer private sector expectations about future policy rates. Eggertsson et al.
(2003) show that optimal commitment to delayed response can mitigate the distortions created by
the zero lower bound on the interest rate.
There are also papers that discuss the gains from policy commitment under imperfect informa-
tion. Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2004) assume that the central
bank has imperfect information and show that the optimal policy under commitment displays con-
siderable inertia, relative to the discretionary policy, due to the persistence in the learning process.
Lorenzoni (2010) and Paciello and Wiederholt (2013) explore the idea that the central bank is able
to change the learning process in the private sector if it is able to commit to completely offset inef-
ficient shocks. However, none of the above papers assume that monetary policy has informational
effect.
To the best of my knowledge, the only paper that discusses the time inconsistency problem
resulting from the informational effect of monetary policy is Stein and Sunderam (2016). The
authors use a reduced-form model in which the central bank balances between implementing the
optimal target rate and minimizing the information revealed about this target. In their paper, pri-
vate agents are assumed not to have rational expectations about the central bank’s behaviors. The
discretionary central bank always has incentives to deviate from the target interest rate, to reveal
less information about its target. In my paper, I assume that private agents have rational expec-
tations about how the central bank would react under both discretionary policy and a policy rule.
Relative to the perfect information case, both optimizing discretionary policy and the optimal pol-




In this section, I use the same model as described in the previous chapter, and start with the case in
which shocks have no serial correlation. With forward-looking agents, expectations about future
equilibrium matter for current consumption and pricing decisions. Consequently, even with seri-
ally uncorrelated shocks, a committed central bank may choose a policy rule that responds to past
shocks, meaning that the expectations about the direct effect of future interest rates also change
the current equilibrium, which potentially leads to gains from commitment. The gains from com-
mitting to a delayed response still apply under imperfect information. However, to focus on the
within-period gains from the informational effect, I study a state-contingent policy rule that only
responds to current shocks. Consequently, the IS curve and the Phillips curve are found to be:
yˆt =− 1σ (it− r
n
t ) , (2.1)
pit = (1−θ)Est pit +κθ yˆt +ut . (2.2)
As private agents know the structure of the economy, they form expectations on the output gap
and inflation accordingly.









(it−Est rnt ) (2.4)
Private agents are assumed to be unable to observe the realization of shocks directly, and use the
interest rate as the only signal to form exceptions about the shocks. When private agents expect the




























F2r σ2r +F2u σ2u
.
In contrast to the problem for a discretionary central bank, which takes as given how beliefs
will be formed in the private sector, a committed central bank is able to control beliefs by announc-
ing a monetary policy rule prior to the realization of shocks. The central bank with commitment
internalizes the change in the Kalman gains when deciding the policy rule to implement. In other




u ut , the central bank under com-
mitment chooses a direct mapping from the actual shocks to the expected shocks.
2.2.1 The Phillips Curve under Policy Rules
In this section, I show that the Phillips curve becomes endogenous to the choice of the policy
rule. A committed central bank internalizes the fact that its policy-rule decisions will change the
sensitivity of expected shocks to the interest rate and, consequently, changes the trade-off between
inflation and the output gap.
Specifically, the Phillips curve applying to a central bank with commitment that describes the
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The difference with the discretionary case is that the K∗r and K∗u are no longer constant, but
endogenously determined by the choice of policy rule, i.e., K∗r = K(Fr,Fu), K∗u = K(Fr,Fu) as
specified in equation (2.5).
In the following figure, I illustrate how committing to a policy rule changes the Phillips curve
through an example such that it = rnt , i.e., the central bank commits that it tracks the natural rate
one-to-one and never responds to cost-push shocks.
In this figure, I plot the available trade-offs of inflation versus the output gap after a natural rate
shock, for both the case in which private agents are convinced by the rule and the case in which
private agents believe the central bank will be discretionary. As argued in the previous chapter,
in the discretionary case, as the interest rate responds to both shocks which makes private agents
unable to perfectly tell the realization of shocks, inflation raises as the informational effect of
tightening policy brings inflation expectations up. The best available equilibrium under discretion
is the tangent point between the Phillips curve and the indifference curve of the central bank, which
is approximately (−0.1,0.03).
However, under the interest rate rule which only responds to natural-rate shocks, private agents
assign probability one to the event that a natural-rate shock is realized whenever they observe a
change in the interest rate. Consequently, after an actual natural rate shock, the expected natural
rate equals the actual natural rate, and the expected cost-push shock equals to the actual cost-push
shock which is zero. The economy is no different from the economy under perfect information, in
which case the Phillips curve after natural rate shock crosses the origin of the (yˆt ,pit) plane.
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Figure 2.1: The Phillips Curve under Policy Rule with Unanticipated Deviations
In the above figure, I plot the Phillips curve after a natural rate shock under discretionary policy
(black line) and the Phillips curve when private agents are convinced about the rule that it = rnt .
i.e., Fr = 1 and Fu = 0 (blue line). The dotted ellipse denotes the indifference curve of the central
bank with the loss function, L = pi2t +ω yˆ2t
Under this specific policy rule, the first best equilibrium can be achieved, which shows the
important role of commitment. The first best equilibrium is not only determined by the realization
of the natural-rate shock and the response of interest rate to the natural-rate shock, but is also
determined by how the interest rate would respond if the other shock is realized. It is because the
central bank has committed that it will never respond to the cost-push shock, so the interest rate
can provide perfect information to the realization of the natural rate shock.
This specific policy rule achieves the optimal informational effect, as it minimizes the expected
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cost-push shocks and provides perfect information after natural-rate shocks. However, it is not the
optimal commitment, because although it achieves the first best after a natural-rate shock, the
central bank also cares about the equilibrium after cost-push shocks. Being completely inelastic to
cost-push shocks is not optimal, because the central bank wants to balance the direct effect and the
informational effect of interest rates.
Notice that along this Phillips curve, the origin of the (yˆt , pit) is the only equilibrium point
which is consistent with the rule. Other points captures the equilibrium when the informational
effect of the interest rate is fixed, (private agents have been convinced that it = rnt ) but the central
bank deviates from this rule. For example, the Phillips curve below pit = 0 is the equilibrium in
which the interest rate acts stronger than tracking one-to-one with the natural-rate shock. The
Phillips curve is fixed by the informational effect of the interest rate and the realization of the
actual shock. The change in the informational effect shifts the Phillips curve, and moving along
the Phillips curve captures the direct effect of the interest rate.
In the following figure, I plot the available output gap versus inflation trade-off when changes
of the interest rate are expected by private agents. In the first figure, the blue line illustrates the
Phillips curve under perfect information, after a natural-rate shock such that rnt = 1 and ut = 0.
It crosses the origin and has a positive slope of κ . The red curve represents the Phillips curve.
Tracing the Phillips curve from a positive output gap to a negative output gap corresponds to an
increase in the positive response of the interest rate to the natural-rate shock, which is equivalent
to an increasing Fr. Importantly, the effect of the increasing Fr to inflation also depends on the
value of Fu, as (Fr,Fu) jointly determines (Kr,Ku). Therefore, I fix Fu = 1 to illustrate the effect of
the change in Fr. When Fr increases, its marginal effect on the output gap is constant, − 1σ , but its
marginal effect on inflation changes, because the marginal informational effect of the interest rate
changes as (Kr, Ku) changes with respect to Fr.
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Figure 2.2: The Phillips Curve under Policy Rule with Anticipated Deviations
In the above figures, I plot the Phillips curve under policy rule. The first figure shows the Phillips
curve after a natural-rate shock, where I fixed Fu = 1 and vary Fr. The second figure shows the
Phillips curve after a cost-push shock, I fixed Fr = 1 and vary Fu. Prior distribution of shocks are
set equal to each other, such that σr = σu = 0.1.
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In this figure, this change is illustrated by a steeper slope as the output gap decreases. Intu-
itively, as the private agents expect the interest rate to respond more aggressively to the natural-
rate shock, they assign a lower probability to the event that a cost-push shock will be realized.
Therefore, the informational effect of the tightening monetary policy leads to a smaller increase in
expected inflation, which results in a steeper slope.
In the second figure, the blue line is the Phillips curve under perfect information after a cost-
push shock, such that rnt = 0 and ut = 1. The red curve is the Phillips curve under imperfect
information, where I vary the value of Fu while fixing Fr = 1. In this figure, the change in the
marginal informational effect is more significant than that the first figure. Tracing the Phillips
curve from left to right, it represents a decreasing response of the interest rate to a cost-push shock,
which is equivalent to a decrease in Fu. As Lemma 1 suggests, a smaller Fu increases Kr, and has a
non-monotonic effect on Ku. The combined effect depends on the value of Fu, together with other
parameters. When Fu is very small, an increase in its value decreases the output gap, but barely
decreases inflation. This is because at this level of Fu, an increase in its value increases both Kr
and Ku, (see Figure 1.1, top row). Therefore, the informational effect almost completely offsets the
direct effect, which increases the borrowing cost.
2.2.2 Optimal Policy Rule
The optimal simple rule is found by choosing the interest rate feedback rule it = f (rnt , ut , pit , yˆt)
prior to the realization of shocks, which becomes it = Frrnt +Fuut in equilibrium. The optimal




pi2t (rt , ut)+ω yˆ
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t (rt , ut)dr
n
t dut , (2.7)
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subject to
yˆt =− 1σ [(Fr−1)r
n

























t +KrFuut , (2.10)
Est ut = KuFur
n
t +KuFuut . (2.11)
Comparing this problem with the problem for a discretionary central bank (equation 1.21), we
find that the available set of combinations of (yˆt , pit) is expanded due to the additional degree of
freedom, i.e. instead of choosing interest rate, the central bank with commitment chooses Fr and




u ut , the central
bank chooses a direct mapping from the actual shocks to the expected shocks. In comparison,
even if a discretionary central bank changes its response of interest rate, the private sector still







the informational effect of the interest rate cannot be changed when the central bank does not have
credible commitment. In other words, (Kr,Kr) are endogenous choice variables only when the
central bank has credible commitment. Otherwise, the central bank regards (Kr,Kr) as exogenous
to its interest rate decisions.
The key difference between a central bank with commitment and a discretionary central bank
is that the central bank with commitment internalizes its policy responses determine the Phillips
curve, which is the constraint that it faces. We now turn to comparing the optimal policy rule with
the equilibrium interest rate under discretionary central bank using the first-order conditions. The
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key factor in this analysis is that the effect of the interest rate after one shock also depends on how
it would react to the other shock, because the informational effect, (Kr, Ku) is jointly determined
by the response of the interest rate to both shocks, (Fr, Fu). (Fr,Fu) are jointly determined by the
first-order condition on Fr after the rnt shock, and the first-order condition on Fu after the ut shock.




















where Ωr = (1−θ) κσ , and Ωu = 1−θθ Ku.




















To illustrate the difference between the equilibrium interest rate under the discretionary opti-
mizing policy and under the optimal policy rule, I write the first-order condition on the interest rate

















where Ωr = (1−θ) κσ , and Ωu = 1−θθ Ku.
Comparing the first-order conditions under commitment, the discretionary central bank regards
the informational effect of the interest rate as exogenous to its interest rate decisions. Specifically,
it does not internalize the change in the Kalman gain with respect to a change in the interest rate.
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This is because (Kr, Ku) are determined by the private sector’s expectations about the interest rate
reaction function. Then, if the private agents believe that the central bank will optimize at any





In Figure 2.3, I draw the optimal F∗r at varying values of Fu which is the solution to equation
(2.12), and the optimal F∗u for varying values of Fr, which is the solution to equation (2.13). The
point where two lines cross is (F∗r ,F∗u ).
Figure 2.3: Solution to the Optimal Policy Rule
In this figure, each point on the red line represents solution of F∗r (Fu) that satisfies the first order
condition on Fr as specified in equation (35), and each point on the blue line represents solution of
F∗u (Fr) that satisfies the first order condition on Fu as specified in equation (36). The point where
two line cross defines (F∗r ,F∗u ).
As suggested by Lemma 1, both the sensitivity of the interest rate to shocks, and the prior
distribution of shocks matter for the informational effect of the interest rate. Next, I posit assump-
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tions on the prior distribution of shocks, which help me compare the optimal policy rule with the
equilibrium interest rate response under discretionary central bank.
Assumption 3. σrn = σu.
Proposition 3: Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, i) the optimal policy rule responds more ag-
gressively to a natural-rate shock than the equilibrium response of the interest rate under discre-
tionary policy, for a given response to cost-push shocks, and ii) the optimal policy rule responds
less aggressively to a cost-push shock than the equilibrium response of the interest rate under
discretionary policy, for a given response to natural-rate shocks.
Proof: see the Appendix 2.1.
Under the above assumptions, increasing the response to natural-rate shocks (Fr) or decreasing







decreases the informational effect of the interest rate. Specifically, it means that (1) Ωr ∂Kr∂Fr +





As the central bank with commitment internalizes the effect of the interest rate decisions on
the Phillips curve, it wants to reduce the marginal informational effect of interest rate, making
interest rate more "effective" in offsetting the shocks. Assumption (1) guarantees that a higher
value of Fr decreases the marginal informational effect of interest rate after natural-rate shocks,
and Assumption (2) guarantees that a lower value of Fu decreases the marginal informational effect
of the interest rate after cost-push shocks.
The gains from commitment come from (a) the increase in the slope of the Phillips curve after
both shocks and (b) the decrease in the intercept after natural-rate shocks. As shown in the Phillips
curve expressed, (a) and (b) are equivalent, and thus have same implication for the value of Fcr and
Fcu . Intuitively, more precise information on natural-rate shocks and less precise information on
cost-push shocks reduces the conflict between the direct effect and the informational effect of the
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interest rate.
Another way to investigate the comparison between the optimal policy rule and the equilibrium
interest rate under discretionary policy is that as a central bank with commitment internalizes the
informational effect of the interest rate, it balances between the optimal informational effect and
the optimal direct effect on the borrowing cost.
The optimal informational effect is such that the central bank reveals perfect information about
the natural-rate shock, and completely withholds information about the cost-push shock. This
is because the natural-rate shock is efficient, as it changes the natural level of output together
with the price level. Therefore, the natural-rate shock does not cause a conflict between output
gap stabilization and inflation stabilization under perfect information. In comparison, the cost-
push shock only changes the price level without chancing the natural level of output. Thus, it
is inefficient, and leads to a conflict between output gap stabilization and inflation stabilization.2
The optimal informational effect of the interest rate can be achieved by either setting Fr → ∞ or
setting Fu = 0. Balancing the optimal informational effect and the optimal direct effect results in
the interest rate being more sensitive to the natural-rate shocks and less sensitive to the cost-push








In this section, I analyze the time inconsistency problem which refers to the situation in which
the central bank has an incentive to deviate from its previously committed policy rule. The con-
ventional wisdom on the time inconsistency problem applies across time periods. For example, as
discussed in Eggertsson et al. (2003), when the current interest rate hits the zero lower bound, the
2Existing literature has discussed how information on efficient shocks is beneficial. See Morris and Shin (2002),
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), Angeletos, Iovino and La’O (2016) as examples.
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central bank can encourage current consumption by committing to a lower interest rate in future
periods such that Etpit+1 > 0, when consumption decisions are forward-looking. However, the cen-
tral bank will face a time inconsistency problem at t +1, because pit+1 > 0 is sub-optimal. In my
baseline model, I have shut down this conventional channel of commitment, so that the time incon-
sistency across time periods does not apply. Instead, I present a novel time inconsistency problem
that applies across states. Specifically, the central bank wants to implement a different interest rate
conditional on the realization of shocks, rather than according to its previously announced policy
rule.
The intuition for the time inconsistency problem is that a discretionary central bank does not
take into account the change of the informational effect of interest rates when deviating from the
policy rule. Mathematically, if a central bank has convinced the private sector that it will implement




u ut , the sensitivity of expected shocks to changes in the interest rate is fixed. At this
point, the central bank wants to re-optimize its interest rate decisions. The incentives for deviation
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: After the central bank has committed to a policy rule, there is always a prof-
itable deviation after either natural-rate shocks or cost-push shocks, as long as the deviation is
unexpected and thus the informational effect of the interest rate remains unchanged.
Proof: see the Appendix 2.1.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is the following. Prior to the realization of shocks, the optimal
policy rule has committed to respond more aggressively to natural-rate shocks (Proposition 1),
as it optimally weighs between decreasing the combined informational effect of the interest rate
and the direct effect on the borrowing cost. If the central bank decides to implement an one-time
deviation which is not expected by the private sector, it is able to keep the informational effect
fixed and considers only its direct effect. By doing so, the central bank takes the informational
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advantage such that the private sector believes the shock is more likely to be a natural-rate shock
than a cost-push shock, without actually sacrificing a lower output gap when a natural-rate shock
is realized. However, if the private sector anticipates such deviation, the private sector will update
the sensitivity of its beliefs to changes in the interest rate, leaving no profitable deviation available
for the central bank.
I illustrate the incentives for deviation after a natural-rate shock in the following graph.
Figure 2.4: The Phillips Curve after a Natural-rate Shock under Optimal Policy Rule
The dotted ellipse is the indifference curve for the central bank whose objective function consists
the weighed sum of squared inflation and the squared output gap. The black line is the Phillips
curve under discretion, and the red and blue lines are the Phillips curve when the central bank has
convinced private agents about the (1) optimal policy rule and (2) (Fr,Fu) = (1,0), respectively.
As noted above, there is only one point along the Phillips curve under commitment that is
consistent with the rule, and such points are denoted by the red circles. The first figure shows that
after a natural-rate shock, the central bank has convinced private agents about the optimal rule, it
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wants to deviate from the equilibrium under commitment to a point which is closer to the origin
by implementing a smaller interest rate than the committed rule. However, a better equilibrium
can only be achieved if such deviation is not anticipated, under which case the informational effect
of the interest rate is fixed by the commitment, so changing Fr will not change the slope of the
Phillips curve. Mathematically, it means that the marginal informational effect of the interest rate,
ΩrKr (Fcr ,Fcu ) +ΩuKu (Fcr ,Fcu ), will not change as Fr changes, as the private sector expects the
central bank to implement (Fcr , F
c
u ).
Specifically, after a natural-rate shock, when the central bank deviates to a smaller interest rate
response than it had committed to (Fr < Fcr ), the Phillips curve has a lower pit at any level of yˆt .
This change in the Phillips curve suggests that by deviating to a smaller interest rate response to
a natural-rate shock, the central bank achieves a one-time welfare improvement. However, if such
deviation is anticipated, the Phillips curve will shift up, because as private agents expect a lower
Fr
Fr
ratio, they increases their expected cost push shocks after any change in the interest rate.
The only equilibrium that is consistent with the optimal rule is denoted in the red circle, which
locates on an indifference curve that is worse than the one where the equilibrium under discretion is
located (the tangent point between the indifference curve and the Phillips curve under discretion).
This seems counter-intuitive as there should be gains from commitment. The reason is that the
central bank does not optimize at every state, but optimizes across all states. In fact, it sacrifices
after a natural-rate shock and gains after a cost-push shock. I illustrate the equilibrium after a
cost-push shock in the following figure. Notice that the unit of shock is chosen to be 0.1 instead
of 1. This is to make comparable to Figure 2.5 while maintaining the scale of the two figures to be
the same.
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Figure 2.5: The Phillips Curve after a Cost-push Shock under Optimal Policy Rule
The dotted ellipse is the indifference curve for the central bank whose objective function consists
the weighed sum of squared inflation and the squared output gap. The black line is the Phillips
curve under discretion, and the red and blue lines are the Phillips curve when the central bank has
convinced private agents about the (1) optimal policy rule and (2) (Fr,Fu) = (1,0), respectively.
2.3 Direct Communication
This section studies the optimal direct communication strategy for the central bank, which is mod-
eled as the central bank providing public signals independently to the informational effect of inter-
est rates. Unlike the informational effect through the interest rate, which is restricted by the signal
dimension, central bank direct communication is not bounded by the signal dimension.
The central bank controls for the precision of these external signals. The general consensus
on optimal communication strategy for the central bank is that it should provide more precise
information about the efficient shocks (natural-rate shocks in this setting) and should not provide
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information about the inefficient shocks (cost-push shocks in this setting).3 In my model, however,
the value of central bank communication interacts with the informational effect through policy
rate, which should change the optimal direct communication strategy.
2.3.1 Interaction between the Informational Effect of Monetary Policy and
Central Bank Direct Communication
Denote the external signals sent through the central bank communications as mrt and m
u
t , which are
distributed log normally around the actual shocks, rnt and ut . I assume that the interest rate does not
react to the external signals. However, the existence of external signals changes the informational
effect of the interest rate, which consequently changes both the equilibrium interest rate under
discretionary central bank and the optimal policy rule.
Signals
The signals consist of both the interest rate and external signals sent through the central bank





















3see Kramer et al. (2008) for survey of literature on central bank communication.
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where the Kalman gains in the K matrix are determined through the optimal filtering process.
The informational effect of the interest rate interact with central bank communication. When
the central bank communicates more precisely about one shock, the private sector assigns a greater
weight on the information from direct communication versus the information from the interest rate.
At the same time, the interest rate becomes a more precise signal of the other shock. For example,
suppose that the central bank precisely communicates about the rnt shock; then after a positive
cost-push shock, the private agents know that rnt = 0 through the direct communication by the
central bank. In addition, the private agents also observe that the interest rate responds positively,
so that they infer precisely that the increase in the interest rate is due to the positive realization of
a cost-push shock.
However, the existence of the informational effect of policy rates also changes the effect of
central bank communication. K13 and K22 measure how much information is "falsely" updated to
beliefs via external signals. Without an informational effect transmitted through the policy rate,
K13 and K22 would be equal to zero, as signals are distributed independently, and the signal of
one shock does not provide information about the other shock. However, as the interest rate is
one signal about the two shocks, the interaction with the informational effect of the interest rate
makes the central bank unable to separately convey information. Specifically, both K13 and K22
are negative. Intuitively, suppose that the interest rate does no change and that external signals on
natural rate goes up; in this case, the private sector would then back out a negative change in the
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cost-push shock.
K12 and K23 measure how much information is "correctly" updated through external signals. In
Figure 6, I plot how the sensitivity of beliefs to each signal changes when the interest rate reacts
more aggressively to a natural-rate shock, while holding its response to a cost-push shock fixed
(varying Fr from 0.1 to 2 while fixing Fu = 1).
Figure 2.6: Sensitivity of Beliefs to External Signals
In all 6 figures, I set Fu = 1, and vary Fr from 0.1 to 2. Ex-ante dispersion of shocks are set to
be equal with each other, such that σr = σu = 0.1. The top row is the sensitivity of beliefs about
natural-rate shocks with respect to all three signals, the interest rate, the external information about
the natural-rate shock, and the external information about the cost-push shock. The second row
is the sensitivity of beliefs about cost-push shocks with respect to all three signals, the interest
rate, the external information about the natural-rate shock, and the external information about the
cost-push shock.
As illustrated in the first row, when the sensitivity of Est r
n
t to the change in the interest rate is
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not monotonic, as suggested by Lemma 1. The second figure in the first row shows the weight on
mrt decreases as the interest rate becomes a more precise signal about r
n
t . The second row shows
that increasing the sensitivity of interest rate to the natural-rate shock also decreases the sensitivity
of Est ut to interest rate changes, and increases the sensitivity of E
s
t ut to central bank communication
about the cost-push shock. Intuitively, since the private agents optimally weight these three signals,
when the interest rate reacts more aggressively to the natural-rate shock, it becomes a more precise
signal than mrt . At the same time, it becomes a less precise signal than m
u
t . For this reason, K12
decreases and K23 increases.
2.3.2 Value of (External) Information
To assess the value of external information through the direct communication from the central
bank, we first need to study how the optimal response of the interest rate changes under discretion
and with commitment, as the central bank takes into account the interaction between the informa-
tional effect of the interest rate and the direct communication. The Phillips curve with all signals





























The existence of the informational effect of the interest rate complicates the welfare effect of
central bank communication. Without the information effect of interest rate, welfare is maximized
when the central bank provides perfectly precise signal about the efficient shock (the natural-
rate shock), and completely uninformative signal about the inefficient shock (the cost-push shock).
However, with the information effect of the interest rate, if agents in the private agents have precise
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information about one shock through communications, they are able to infer precise information
about the other shock from the interest rate.
In the following figure, I plot the ex-ante loss of the central bank at varying precision of central
bank direct communication.
Figure 2.7: The Value of Direct Communication
Figures plot the indifference curves of the ex-ante central bank loss function, i.e., EL = var(pi2t )+
ω · var(yˆt). The left column is under discretion and the right column is under policy rule. Prior
distribution of the shocks are set as σr = σu = 0.1.
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In the first row of Figure 2.6, I show the contour plot at varying levels of precision of central
bank communication under optimizing discretionary policy (left) and under optimal policy rule
(right). It shows that when communication about the cost-push shock becomes more imprecise,
which is modeled by a lower σeu, the ex-ante loss increases. This is consistent with the conven-
tional wisdom that more precise information about the inefficient shock is welfare reducing. How-
ever, when the precision of central bank communication about natural-rate shocks increases, which
is modeled by a smaller σer, the ex-ante loss also increases. This contradicts the conventional wis-
dom.4 In summary, when the interest rate is able to provide sufficiently precise information about
the efficient shock, additional direct communication about either shocks reduces ex-ante welfare.
Next, I add an implementation error to the interest rate function, such that it = Frrnt +Fuut +et .
The interest rate becomes a noisier signal of both shocks when the variance of the implementation
error increases. I show the contour plot at varying levels of precision of central bank commu-
nication, assuming the implementation error of the interest rate has a standard deviation of 0.5.
Since interest rate becomes a relatively imprecise signal now, the value of (external) informa-
tion becomes the same as the conventional wisdom. The loss is minimized when information on
natural-rate shock is most precise and information on the cost-push shock is least precise.
2.4 Quantitative Assessment
The goal of this section is to quantify the size of the gains from commitment using a dynamic
model with varying degrees of information precision. I begin with the case where there are no
external signals. In this case, the information precision depends on the prior distribution of the
actual shocks. I then consider the case where there are external signals, and in addition, I allow for
4For the conventional wisdom on the value of information, see Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan
(2007), Angeletos, Iovino and La’O (2016), for examples
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an implementation error in the interest rate. By varying the precision of signals, I quantitatively
assess how the gains from commitment depend on the precision of external information.
I use the same dynamic model with parameters calibrated in the same way as in the previous
chapter. The actual state variables evolve as
zt =Φzt−1+ vt (2.19)




, and vt = [vrt , vut ]′ with white noise of variance Q.
The private sector forms expectations about current states through the Kalman filtering process.
Denote the observable signal as
st = Dzt (2.20)
where st = it , and D = [F1,F3]
′.
The Kalman filtering process makes beliefs about the current state variables be the optimal










where the optimal weight, K, is determined by Ricatti iteration




The objective function for the committed central bank is the same as the discretionary central
bank. I require that the committed central bank can only commit to a rule which responds linearly
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to current state variables. Notice that as past beliefs determine current beliefs, they also become
current state variables. In equilibrium, the optimal rule follows same functional form as the dis-






t−1ut−1. The coefficients of the
optimal rule, [F1, F2, F3, F4] are selected to minimize the ex-ante loss from the steady state.5







where the output gap and inflation are specified as:6




















pit = βθEst pit+1+(1−θ)Est pit +κθ yˆt +ut . (2.26)
and the actual shocks and expected shocks follow equations (2.19) - (2.23).
In contrast to the serially uncorrelated case, in which I completely shut down the gains from
commitment through delayed response, I allow for such gains in the dynamic case. Potentially, the
policy rule can react to current cost-push shocks by a lesser extent and commits to a large response
to past beliefs than a discretionary interest rate does. In doing so, not only does interest rate reveal
less information about the cost-push shock, it also decreases expected inflation. The gains from
committing to a delayed response strengthen the gains from the informational effect.
5In steady state, Est−1r
n
t−1 = 0, and E
s
t−1ut−1 = 0.
6See Chapter 1 for derivations.
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2.4.1 No External Information
I numerically solve for both the equilibrium interest rate under discretion and the optimal policy
rule under the baseline dynamic model, which yields the following results:
idiscretionary = 1.3887rnt −0.3498Est−1rnt−1+0.1852ut +0.3370Est−1ut−1
irule = 1.3727rnt −0.3374Est−1rt−1+0.1830ut +0.3332Est−1ut−1
Regarding the equilibrium interest rate under discretion, the novelties of the dynamic case are
the value of F2 and F4. They capture how the interest rate optimally responds to the beliefs in the
past period. As beliefs are persistent, reacting to past beliefs leads to inertia in the interest rate. As
analyzed in the belief-formation process, this response has no informational effect, as the private




t−1ut−1 to obtain signals in current period.
Specifically, a negative F2 means central bank counteracts the excess response to the natural-rate
shock in the first period. A positive F4 means that the central bank makes up for the deficient
response to the cost-push shock in the first period. The intuition can be found in the output gap
equation and inflation equation, which show that an expected natural rate decreases output gap
and expected cost push shock increases inflation. As past beliefs contribute positively to current
beliefs, the interest rate optimally responds to past beliefs to offset their contribution to current
deviations.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse Response with No External Signals
Parameters are chosen as φ = 0.9, φu = 0.3, unitary Frisch elasticity of labor supply and log utility
of consumption. I use θ−0.5 for price rigidity and ε = 4 for elasticity of substitution, and discount
factor β = 0.99.
Compared with the optimal response of a discretionary central bank, the response coefficients
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in the optimal policy rule do not differ substantially. This is because the relative sensitivity of
expected cost-push shocks and expected natural-rate shocks to interest rates is already very small
when there are no external signals. Consequently, when a central bank with commitment chooses
the optimal policy rule to balance the informational effect and the direct effect, it does not differ
much from the equilibrium under an optimizing central bank.
This suggests that the welfare gains from commitment is not significant. I calculate the ex-ante
welfare loss as the loss function of the central bank, which is 0.0325 for the discretionary case and
0.0324 for the commitment case. In Figure 2.7, I plot the impulse response after a natural-rate
shock, a cost-push shock and a policy error, which also show that the difference in equilibrium
under discretionary policy and under policy rule is negligible when the interest rate is the only
source of information.
2.4.2 Varying Precision of External Information
The precision of external signals crucially determines the gains from commitment, as it affects
the size of the informational effect of the interest rate. The previous literature does not provide
consensus on the degree of information frictions in the private sector. Instead of calibrating the
precision of external signals, I investigate how the size of the gains varies with the precision of
external signals. I first set the variance of the external signals to be same as the variance of the
ex-ante dispersion of the actual shocks. In addition, I also allow for an implementation error in the
interest rate.
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The interest rate is numerically solved as follows:
idiscretionary = 1.4402rnt −0.3962Est−1rnt−1+0.4485ut +0.2578Et−1ut−1,
irule = 1.2818rnt −0.2430Est−1rt−1+0.0373ut +0.5184Est−1ut−1.
There most significant difference is the response of the interest rate to the cost-push shock. The
optimal policy rule responds very little in the period when the cost-push shock is realized, shown as
Fcomm3 = 0.0373 and in comparison, F
disc
3 = 0.4485. In addition, the optimal policy rule responds
to a greater extent to the expected cost-push shock in the last period, shown as Fcomm4 = 0.5184, and
in comparison, Fdisc4 = 0.2578. In other words, the interest rate under optimal commitment has an
inertial components: it responds little contemporaneously but commits to react more aggressively
in future periods.
In this way, the informational gains and the traditionally studied gains from a delayed response
reinforce each other. By reacting little to the actual cost-push shock contemporaneously, the central
bank reduces the sensitivity of the expected cost-push shock to the interest rate. At the same time,
by committing to a greater response in later periods, the central bank reduces expected future
inflation.
Figure 2.8 compares the impulse response function after a natural rate shock, a cost push shock
and a policy rate shock under discretionary policy and under policy rule.
79
Figure 2.9: Impulse Response with Precise External Signals
Parameters are chosen as φ = 0.9, φu = 0.3, unitary Frisch elasticity of labor supply and log utility
of consumption. I use θ−0.5 for price rigidity and ε = 4 for elasticity of substitution, and discount
factor β = 0.99.
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In the rest of this section, I show how the size of gains depends on the precision of external
signals. First of all, holding the standard deviation of mrt fixed at 0.1, I vary the precision of
external signal on natural rate shock from 0.01 to 0.1. 7 In the following table I report the welfare
gains measured by the ex-ante loss function of the central bank 8 standard deviation of inflation
and standard deviation of output gap for both types of central bank. When signal on natural rate
changes from relatively imprecise σεr = 0.1 to very precise σεr = 0.01, the welfare gains measured
by the ex-ante loss function of the central bank increases from 64 percent to 70.4 percent.
Discretionary Rule
σεr = 0.01 σεr = 0.05 σεr = 0.1 σεr = 0.01 σεr = 0.05 σεr = 0.1
Ex-ante Loss 5.13 3.78 3.76 1.84 1.89 1.10
Inflation 1.45 1.11 1.1 1.2 1.12 1.10
Output Gap 4.63 4.42 4.46 2.35 2.31 2.33
Table 2.1: Gains from Commitment at Varying Levels of Precision of External Information on rnt
The ex-ante loss is calculated as the objective function of the central bank defined in equation (57)
×102. The numbers for inflation and output gap are noted in percentage points.
In the following table, I report the size of gains from commitment when holding the standard
deviation of mut fixed at 0.1, and varying the standard deviation of external signal on cost-push
shock from 0.01 to 0.1. When signal on natural rate changes from relatively imprecise σεr = 0.1
to very precise σεr = 0.01, the welfare gains measured by the ex-ante loss function of the central
bank increases from 28 percent to 49 percent.
7standard deviation of interest rate implementation error is fixed to be 0.01 in all calibration exercises.
8This is defined as the objective function for commitment central bank in equation (57), which is the weighted sum
of squared deviations from steady state.
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Discretionary Rule
σεu = 0.01 σεu = 0.05 σεu = 0.1 σεu = 0.01 σεu = 0.05 σεu = 0.1
Ex-ante Loss 6.28 3.76 3.76 4.53 1.90 1.89
Inflation 1.39 1.12 1.1 1.12 1.14 1.10
Output Gap 5.99 4.56 4.46 5.22 2.39 2.33
Table 2.2: Gains from Commitment at Varying Levels of Precision of External Information on ut
The ex-ante loss is calculated as the objective function of the central bank defined in equation (57)
×102. The numbers for inflation and output gap are noted in percentage points.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I studied how committing to the optimal policy rule improves ex-ante welfare. To
do so, I analyzed how commitment can change the informational effect of interest rates, which
consequently changes the Phillips curve. In addition, I also showed how the informational effect
through policy rates changes the implications of optimal strategy of central bank direct communi-
cation. Quantitatively, using a calibrated dynamic model, I showed that the size of the gains from
commitment depends on the degree of informational frictions in the private sector.
I used the same New Keynesian model as the previous chapter. When the central bank has con-
vinced private agents that it would implement a different policy rule than its equilibrium response
under discretion, it is able to shift the Phillips curve. Consequently, the informational effect of
interest rates makes the Phillips curve endogenous to the central bank’s decision about the optimal
policy rule.
The responses of the optimal policy rule to the two shocks are jointly determined. Assuming
that the natural-rate shock and the cost-push shock have the same ex-ante dispersion, The optimal
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policy rule responds more aggressively to the natural-rate shock and less aggressively to the cost-
push shock, relative to the equilibrium optimizing interest rate set by discretionary central bank. By
doing so, it achieves an informational advantage as it withholds information about the cost-push
shock, which consequently reduces the stabilization bias caused by the actual cost-push shocks
under perfect information.
I extended the analysis by studying the interaction between the informational effect of the
interest rate and external signals. Central bank direct communication can also be modeled as
providing external signals independent to the informational effect of the interest rates. I presented
the situation in which providing more precise information about the efficient shocks might reduce
welfare. In this case, communicating about the natural-rate shock also makes the interest-rate a
more precise signal about the cost-push shock.
Finally, I quantified the size of the gains from commitment by adopting conventionally used
parameter values while varying the precision of external signals. I found that when external signals
are extremely imprecise, the size of gains from commitment is negligible. However, more precise
external information about both shocks increases the size of gains from commitment. Specifically,
when the precision of external signals is equal to the prior distribution of actual shocks, committing
to the optimal policy rule improves ex-ante welfare by 54 percent relative to the equilibrium under
the optimizing discretionary policy.
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Chapter 3




What should a central bank do when both itself and the private sector have imperfect information
about the underlying economy? The empirical relevance of this question can be found in the recent
practice of forward guidance policy. Through announcing the forward guidance policy, the central
bank provides its forecast on the future path of policy rates, conditional on its own imperfect
information in the current period.
Campbell et al. (2012) distinguish two types of forward guidance. The first type is called
"Odyssean Forward Guidance", which refers to the situation in which the central bank explicitly
commits to a certain polity rate in future periods. The second type is called "Delphic Forward
Guidance", which refers to the situation in which the central bank explains their forecasts of eco-
nomic fundamentals and explains how policy will react if their forecasts are correct, but does not
explicitly committing to any policy actions. Their empirical estimations on the effect of FOMC
announcements show that although communications in the FOMC statements during the recent
financial crisis have Odyssean components, the market interprets it as Delphic communications,
which limits the stimulating effect.
The Delphic forward guidance policy has a longer history. For example, the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand has been doing this policy for more than two decades. Odyssean forward guidance is
advocated by Eggertsson et al. (2003) as a way to boost expected inflation when the target rate hits
the zero lower bound. In normal times, however, economists have been questioning the merit of
Odyssean forward guidance, as it seems to jeopardize future economy without gaining in current
period. In particular, Feroli et al. (2017) argue that forward guidance with commitment1 has two
disadvantages. First, it ignores future macroeconomic news, and second, it reduces flexibility
1In Feroli et al. (2017), forward guidance with commitment is referred to as "time-based" forward guidance,
whereas forward guidance without commitment (with re-optimization) is referred to as "data-based" forward guid-
ance
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in monetary policy decisions. After all, why should the central bank tie its hands while facing
an uncertain future? Feroli et al. (2017) argue that central bank should only communicate what
monetary policy would react to future macroeconomic news, but should allow the actual future
policy to depend on future information when it becomes available.
In this paper, I analyze different strategies to conduct of monetary policy when both the central
bank and the private sector have imperfect information, and find that the optimal strategy to be a
state-contingent commitment which I call "rule-based Odyssean forward guidance". I first study
the benchmark case of no forward guidance, and demonstrate that when private agents cannot per-
fectly observe the aggregate technology shocks, they cannot perfectly predict the response in mon-
etary policy which, which breaks the real dichotomy. Then, I demonstrate that an instrument-based
Odyssean forward guidance, which is the type of forward guidance under traditional definition, im-
proves ex-ante welfare by providing more precise information about the realization of aggregate
technology shocks. Next, I study the time consistent forward guidance: Delphic forward guidance,
in which case the central bank re-optimizes to make the actual monetary policy contingent on fu-
ture information. Lastly, I characterize the optimal monetary policy under imperfect information,
which I call rule-based Odyssean forward guidance.
In this paper, I model a flexible-price economy where firms maximize profit in every period.
Importantly, I assume that pricing decisions are made before households making consumption
decisions. Essentially, price are perfectly flexible across period but completely rigid within period.2
Technology shock is the only source of uncertainty in the private sector, which composites an
idiosyncratic component and an aggregate component. Firms set prices in the beginning of period
when they only observe their firm-specific technology, without knowing the aggregate technology
or decisions made by other firms. The representative household makes consumption decisions
2Most papers on optimal monetary policy with imperfect information use this assumption. Examples include Adam
(2007), Woodford (2001).
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when all information is revealed in the end of the period.
The equilibrium aggregate price level depends on both the actual and the expected aggregate
technology shock, due to the informational frictions. Importantly, due to the monopolistic com-
petitive market, optimal prices are strategically complements. Individual firms increase their price
when they expect a higher aggregate price level or a higher nominal aggregate demand. Con-
sequently, firms also care about the expectations held by other firms, which makes higher order
beliefs matter in the aggregate price level.
I study four strategies to conduct monetary policy. First of all, I use the case without forward
guidance as a benchmark. The central bank decides the nominal aggregate demand in the end
of period when perfect information is available. If information is perfect and private agents have
rational expectations about the central bank’s behaviors, any change in the nominal demand is an-
ticipated by the private sector. Consequently, the real dichotomy holds under perfect information:
prices fully adjust to the change in aggregate nominal demand, and output is determined only by
the aggregate technology. This is because there is no monetary policy shock between pricing de-
cisions and consumption decisions, as firms can precisely predict the following aggregate nominal
demand.
The real dichotomy breaks down under imperfect information. Individual firms use their esti-
mates about the aggregate technology to form expectations about the aggregate nominal demand,
and adjust prices accordingly. After a technology shock, due to informational frictions, private
agents underestimate the actual shock and consequently underestimate the change in the nominal
aggregate demand. In this situation, a part of the response in the aggregate nominal demand be-
comes an unanticipated shock to the private sector. Consequently, the aggregate nominal demand
policy affects both the price level and also the output. I show that for a discretionary central bank
which regards prices are fixed when setting the aggregate nominal demand, it is able to completely
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close the output gap. However, when private agents with rational expectations factor the response
of policy in their pricing decisions, it leads to higher fluctuations in the price level. Consequently,
the central bank with commitment faces the conflict between closing the output gap and stabiliz-
ing the price level. The optimal policy rule changes from output gap stabilization to price level
stabilization when private signals become more imprecise.
The second type is an instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance policy. Through forward
guidance, the central bank discloses its noisy signals about the aggregate technology, which is
used by private agents as a public signal, in addition to their private signals. In addition, the
central bank also announces its expectations about the future nominal demand, conditional on
this noisy signal. Unlike the benchmark case without forward guidance where firms use their
estimates on the aggregate technology to form expectations about the aggregate demand, under
instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance, firms get exact information about the aggregate
nominal demand. Consequently, there is no monetary policy shock between pricing decisions and
consumption decisions, making monetary policy unable to affect real output level.
As the effect of monetary policy is completely absorbed by the aggregate price level, the op-
timal Odyssean forward guidance policy targets price only. The central bank faces the trade-off
between minimizing deviations after technology shocks and minimizing deviations after policy
shocks. Policy shocks are resulted from the noise in the central bank’s information which the
forward guidance policy is conditional on. I show that when the central bank has imprecise infor-
mation, it reduces the sensitivity of aggregate nominal demand to its signal, in order to reduce the
deviations due to the noise in its information.
The third strategy is Delphic forward guidance. In this case, the central bank reveals its noisy
information about the aggregate technology, and explains how nominal aggregate demand will
respond accordingly. However, it does not commit to implement such forward guidance policy.
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Rather, it let the actual aggregate nominal demand condition on future information. In this sit-
uation, private agents need to guess the actual policy, and to do so they have to separately form
expectations about the aggregate technology and the noise in the central bank’s information. As
optimal prices are strategic complements, higher order beliefs matter in pricing decisions, which
make the expected aggregate nominal demand further away from the actual nominal demand.
I first illustrate the incentive for a central bank to be Delphic, which is the time inconsis-
tency problem involves with Odyssean forward guidance: if the central bank has announced the
instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance, it wants to deviate if the signal turns out to be a
noise instead of an actual technology shock. This is because prices are set at the stage of forward
guidance, and the central bank wants to close the output gap by re-optimization. However, closing
the output gap makes the aggregate price level more sensitive to aggregate technology shocks, if
such deviation is anticipated by the private sector. Such trade-off can be solved by implementing
the Delphic forward guidance with backward induction: the central bank decides its response to its
noisy signal about the technology while taking into account the change in the expectations in the
private sector due to re-optimization.
Lastly, I show the optimal monetary policy is a rule-based Odyssean forward guidance policy,
in which case the central bank commits to a state-contingent policy rule instead of committing to a
certain policy action. If the information turns out to be an actual technology shock, the central bank
commits to increase the aggregate nominal demand higher than under Delphic forward guidance.
If the information turns out to be a noise shock, the central bank commits to reduce the aggregate
nominal demand than under Delphic forward guidance. Consequently, price deviations can be
reduced as the central bank optimally balances between fluctuations in the aggregate price level
and the output gap.
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Related Literature
Past literature has extensively discussed the effect of forward guidance. Del Negro, Giannoni and
Patterson (2012) provide empirical evidence that standard DSGE models tend to overestimate the
effect of forward guidance. Angeletos and Lian (2016) answer this puzzle by introducing imperfect
information, and argue that imperfect common knowledge predicts that the attenuated effect of
forward guidance. Besides Feroli et al. (2017), Campbell et al. (2012) also characterize two types
of forward guidance as whether forward guidance is accompanied with or without commitment.
In their paper, "Odyssean Forward Guidance" is defined as making explicit commitment to future
policy actions, whereas "Delphic Forward Guidance" is defined as forecasting economic conditions
without commitment of future policy actions.
In particular, I study the welfare gains from policy commitment in forward guidance. There has
been a long history in studying the gains from monetary policy commitment. Classical literature
include Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), which show the inflationary
bias in the central bank’s objective function leads to higher inflation when the private sector has
rational expectation. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) study how commitment to a future path
of policy rates reduces current stabilization bias between output gap stabilization and inflation
stabilization which is induced by ad-hoc cost-push shocks. Woodford (1999) studies how history-
dependent policy can be achieved by having interest-smoothing included in the central bank’s
objective function. Eggertsson et al. (2003) show optimal commitment to delayed response can
mitigate the distortion under zero lower bound of interest rates.
This paper studies how imperfect information leads to gains from monetary policy commit-
ment, which builds on the abundant literature on optimal monetary policy under imperfect infor-
mation. This field is revived since Woodford (2001), which show how higher order beliefs lead to
persistent effect of monetary policy, following the assumption of imperfect information in Phelps
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(1970) and Lucas (1972). Since then there have been many papers studying optimal monetary pol-
icy under imperfect information. Papers in this field can be divided by their assumption of whether
monetary policy has informational effect.
The majority of papers which characterize optimal monetary policy under information fric-
tions assume monetary policy has no informational effect, and thus assume the beliefs formed in
the private sector are independent of policy decisions. Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) study opti-
mal monetary policy with sticky information, and conclude that optimal monetary policy should be
described as elastic price standard: the central bank should allow price to deviate from target when
output deviates from natural rate. Adam (2007) models partial information economy, and allows
the precision of private signals to be endogenous. He argue that as signals get more precise, opti-
mal monetary policy changes from output gap stabilization to price level stabilization. Lorenzoni
(2010) assumes the central bank has no superior information, and points out announcing mone-
tary policy has trade-off between aggregate stabilization and cross-sectional efficiency. Angeletos
and La’O (2011) consider both nominal and real frictions that caused by information friction, and
describe optimal monetary policy seeks negative correlation between price level and output.
Recent papers have started to investigate the situation where people extract information on the
underlying economy from monetary policy decisions. Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) emphasize
the signaling effect of policy actions, and conclude that the central bank distorts its policy in order
to optimally control the information it conveys. Central bank alters optimal policy response in
order to reduce information revealed on cost push shock through policy decisions. Berkelmans
(2011) demonstrates that with multiple shocks, tightening policy may initially increase inflation.
Tang (2013) shows that with rational expected private sector, the stabilization bias is reduced when
monetary policy has information effect.
My paper deals with the higher order beliefs problem, and past literature has demonstrated how
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higher order beliefs amplify the real effect of monetary policy. (see Woodford (2001) for example)
In addition, many papers have show different solution methods, including Melosi (2016), Huo and
Takayama (2015) and Nimark (2017), as examples.
My paper is also motivate by the empirical evidence on the informational effect of monetary
policy and the policy discussion on forward guidance. Romer and Romer (2000), Romer and
Romer (2004) show the information asymmetry between central bank and the private sector by
providing evidence on inflation forecast changes after FOMC announcement. Faust, Faust, Swan-
son and Wright (2004) further confirm that forecasts by private sector respond to monetary policy
changes. Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) use high frequency trading data to identify the informa-
tional effect of monetary policy news.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: section 2 sets up the private sector of my model. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the three strategies for the central bank to conduct monetary policy under imperfect
information, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
3.2 The Private Sector
This section describes a representative agent economy with flexible prices and dispersed, imperfect
information. The central bank controls the aggregate nominal demand.
The assumption on informational frictions follows Phelps (1970), Woodford (2001), and An-
geletos and La’O (2010), where the informational frictions are results from geographical separation
in decisions of firms. There is a continuum of islands, indexed by i, and a continuum of house-
holds, each of which consists a representative consumer and a continuum of workers. There is a
continuum of firms, each of which is located on one island and indexed by the island. Each firm
i specializes in producing differentiated good i, and sells in a monopolistic competitive market.
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Information is symmetric within island, and asymmetric across island, meaning that a firm does
not know the shocks or decisions made in other islands.
Each period has three stages. In the first stage, technology shocks are realized in all firms. Each
firm i observes its own technology, Ai, but not the technology of others, A j, j 6=i. In the second stage,
all firms set prices based on its own information setωi.3 In the last stage, all information which was
previously dispersed becomes available to everyone. The representative household sends one labor
to each of the island. All markets open. Firms demand labors and produce intermediate goods to
meet demands. At the same time, the household make consumption and labor supply decisions at
all firms.
3.2.1 Household
The preferences of the household are defined over the aggregate consumption good, C and the
labor supplied to each firm, Ni. As specified in the timing of events, the decisions of the household
are made when all information is revealed, so the consumption and labor supply decisions are free




















3Existing literature on informational frictions differs in the assumption of whether firms make pricing or produc-
tion first. Here, I follow the majority to assume that pricing decisions are made prior to production decisions, and
production decisions are made after full information is revealed. For discussion under the althernative assumption
where production decisions are made first, see Angeletos and La’O (2010).
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whereΠ stands for all lump-sum income including profits from firms and T is the nominal transfers
from the central bank. P denotes the aggregate price level which will be derived later.
The household’s optimization problem is solved in two stages. First, conditional on the level
of aggregate consumption, the household allocates intermediate goods consumption to minimize





The result of expenditure minimization problem yields the demand of individual goods as a







where P denotes the aggregate price index after household optimally allocates individual good







The household utility maximization over labor and consumption sets real wage as the marginal









Firms make two decisions: pricing decisions and labor demand decisions. Prices are flexible
across periods. In the beginning of each period, each firm sets price to maximize its expected
profit conditional on its own information set, ωi. The optimal pricing decisions can be written as
follows:
max{Pi}E {PiYi−WiNi|ωi} (3.7)
Firms face two constraints. The first constraint is the demand of individual products, which
comes from the demand across individual goods. The second constraint is the production technol-
ogy, which I assume to be linear in labor, following the tradition in the New Keynesian literature,
which is specified as:
Yi = AiNi (3.8)
where Ai is the firm-specific technology.
3.2.3 States and Signals
The only source of uncertainty in the private sector comes from the technology. I allow for both
an aggregate component and an idiosyncratic component. The firm-specific technology becomes a
linear sum of the two components after log-linearization. Therefore, the firm-specific technology
is a private signal which each firm can use when forming expectations about the aggregate technol-
ogy. In addition to this private signal, firms can also use monetary policy as a public signal, given
that the central bank gets an imperfect signal and release the monetary policy conditional on this
signal when information is still imperfect in the private sector (more details in next section).
Aggregate States
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The only aggregate state variable in the private sector is the aggregate technology shock, which
I assume to be i.i.d. with log-normal distribution.
a¯∼ N(0, σ2a )
Signals
I assume that information is fully revealed after stage 2, so that the representative household
is perfectly informed. Before stage 2, both firms and the central bank are subjected to partial
information. Each firm learns its own technology, ai, which becomes its private signal of a¯ .
ai ≡ log(Ai) = a¯+ si si ∼ N(0,σ2s ) (3.9)
The central bank surveys a random sample of firms, and gets a measurement of a¯. If the central
bank announces this information to firms through forward guidance, firms get a public signal of the
aggregate technology shock. I denote this signal as m. I assume the central bank’s measurement
error is normally distributed with mean 0, so the public signal follows:
m = a¯+υ υ ∼ N(0,σ2υ) (3.10)
3.2.4 Price Setting with Higher Order Beliefs
When firms make pricing decisions, they need to form expectations about the aggregate nominal
demand and the aggregate price level. I solve the equilibrium price by backward induction i.e.,
first substitute the individual good demands and the labor supply function to the optimal prices,
and then derive the optimal price for each firm.
Household expenditure minimization problem, together with market clearing condition, deter-
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(3.12)









which is approximated in a log-linear form as:
pi = Ei [p+αy]−βai (3.14)
where α = ϕ+σ1+εϕ , and β =
1+ϕ
1+εϕ . The operator Ei represents the conditional expectation of firm i on
its own information set, ωi. Equation (3.14) suggests that a firm raises its price when it expects a
higher aggregate price level, a higher aggregate demand, or a lower firm-specific technology which
is equivalent to a higher cost of production.
Higher Order Beliefs
The above equation states the optimal pricing strategy as conditional expectations on aggregate
price and output. The aggregate price is defined to be the average of all pi, and thus average
over all individual expectation on p, which consequently makes pi depend on others belief, and
others belief on others belief, and so on. This creates a higher order beliefs problem. Following
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Woodford (2001), I solve the higher order beliefs problem by successively substituting y by the
nominal demand equation, y = n− p, which yields the following solution. (See Appendix C.1 for
detailed derivation.)
pi = αΣ∞j=1(1−α) j−1EiE¯ j−1n−βΣ∞j=1(1−α) jEiE¯ j−1a¯−βai (3.15)
where E¯ [·] denotes the average expectations operator, given by
E¯ [·] =
∫
Ei [·]diE¯ j [·] =
∫
EiE¯ j−1 [·]di = E¯E¯ j−1 [·] (3.16)
3.3 Monetary Policy under Imperfect Information
This section describes optimal monetary policy when both the private sector and the central bank
have imperfect information about underlying shocks in the economy. I start with the benchmark
case where the central bank only sets the aggregate nominal demand in the last stage, and provides
no forward guidance in the beginning of the period. I then study the case of forward guidance, in
which the central bank reveals the signals that it has about the aggregate technology shock, and at
the same time explains how it will react conditional on its noisy information. I further distinguish
three types of forward guidance policy. First is the instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance
policy, in which case the central bank commits to the future aggregate nominal demand which is
optimal conditional on current noisy signal. The second type is time-consistent Delphic forward
guidance, in which case the central bank re-optimizes in the last stage to completely close the
output gap. The last type is rule-based Odyssean forward guidance, under which the central bank
conditions the actual policy reaction on future information, but commits to policy reaction function
instead of committing to any policy response.
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3.3.1 Benchmark Case - No Forward Guidance
In this benchmark case, the aggregate nominal demand is set in the last stage of each period when
all information is revealed. In this benchmark case, I show both the discretionary monetary policy,
in which the central bank considers prices to be fixed before policy decisions, and the case of policy
rule, in which the central bank takes into account how its behaviors changes expectations in the
private sector, when private agents have rational expectations about the central bank’s behaviors.
In the first stage when firms set optimal prices, the information set of each firm consists only
its firm-specific technology, ωi = {ai}. Firms weigh their private signals and the prior beliefs to











where κs = 1/σ2s denotes the precision of private signals, and κa = 1/σ2a denotes the precision of
the prior.
Optimal prices also depend on the expectations on the response in the aggregate nominal de-
mand. First consider that the policy is linear to the aggregate state variable after log-linearization,
i.e.,
n = γn f ga¯ (3.18)
where γn f g stands for the sensitivity of nominal aggregate demand to changes in aggregate tech-
nology shocks in no forward guidance case.
Under rational expectations, firms form expectations about the aggregate nominal demand con-
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ditional on their own expectations about the aggregate technology as:
Ein = γn f gEia¯ =
κs
κs+κa
γn f gai. (3.19)
As illustrated in the previous section, optimal prices depend on the higher order beliefs, as
optimal prices are strategically complements, and firms use their private signals to form expecta-






and then taking individual expectation, Ei on this first order averaged expectation. Continuing this







Substituting the higher order beliefs on aggregate technology, together with the response of
aggregate nominal demand, into the optimal prices yields the equilibrium price and output level:
p =




βκs+(γn f g+β )κa
κa+ακs
a¯ (3.23)
Infinite Precision of Private Signals
When private signals are of infinite precision, the economy approaches to the perfect informa-
tional case. Substituting κs =∞ into equation (3.23) shows that the output level becomes indepen-
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dent of policy responses, as
y→ β
α
a¯ = ye f f ,
which defines the efficient level of output.
Substituting κs into equation (3.22) shows that the price level captures all the effect of monetary
policy, as
p→ αγn f g−β
α
.
The real dichotomy holds in this case, i.e., monetary policy only affects nominal variables and
does not affect real output. when private agents have rational expectations on the behaviors of
the central bank, and perfectly observe the realization in the aggregate technology shock, they can
adjust prices completely to absorb changes in the monetary policy. There is no monetary policy
shock between pricing decisions and consumption decisions, which makes monetary policy unable
to have any effect on the real output.
However, the real dichotomy does not hold under imperfect information. Even though firms
have rational expectations on the reaction function of the monetary policy, when they do not know
the realization of the aggregate shock, they cannot perfectly foresee the adjustment in the aggregate
nominal demand. This unanticipated gap between the expected nominal aggregate demand and the
actual aggregate demand makes monetary policy have real effect.
Zero precision of private signals
Consider the extreme case where the private signals have zero precision. Firms do not update
beliefs on aggregate technology. Consequently, as the aggregate nominal demand only responds
to the aggregate technology, firms do not update beliefs on the aggregate nominal demand for any
value of γn f g. In this situation, firms adjust prices only due to the changes in the cost of production
of their own firm, i.e., βai, and do not adjust to the aggregate shocks. As they do not update
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beliefs on the aggregate shock, the response in the aggregate nominal demand become a complete
unanticipated shock to all the firms, which results in real effect of monetary policy. Specifically,
substitute κs = 0 into equations (3.22) and (3.23), we find that the aggregate price level and the
aggregate output follow:
p→−β a¯, y = (γn f g+β )a¯.
Intermediate precision
When private signals have finite precision, both real output and price level depends on γn f g. I
plot the equilibrium aggregate price and output after an aggregate technology shock of size 0.1 in
Figure 3.1, to compare the case which γn f g = 1 and γn f g = 5.
We find that the output in both figures approaches to the efficient level, suggesting that when
information approaches to be perfect, i.e., κs→ ∞, monetary policy do not matter in determining
the equilibrium of real variables. In comparison, the price asymptotically goes to different level
depending on the value of γn f g. Only when γn f g = βα , price asymptotically goes to zero.
Optimal Stabilization Policy
The optimal monetary policy without forward guidance is chosen to maximize the central
bank’s objective function, which is set to be the weighted sum of the squared price deviation
and the squared output gap.4
4The second order approximation of the household’s welfare function yields the weight of the output gap versus
price stabilization to be dependent on the precision of private signals. I assume a constant weight to simplify the
description of optimal monetary policy. See Appendix C.2 for derivations of the household’s utility function.
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Figure 3.1: The Equilibrium Price and Output under Fixed Policy Rule without Forward Guidance









where ye f f denotes the efficient level of output which is the output level when information is
perfect. Optimal monetary policy in the benchmark case of no forward guidance is chosen after
central bank observes the realization of a¯. Therefore, choosing n is equivalent to choosing the
value of γn f g.
Discretionary Policy (Output Gap Stabilization Policy)
The optimal discretionary policy is set when the central bank regards prices as fixed prior to









βκs+(γn f g+β )κa
κa+ακs
a¯ (3.26)
Central bank is able to choose the aggregate nominal demand to completely close the output
gap by setting




The output gap stabilization policy is independent to the precision of private signals. This is
because when γn f g is at this value, the sensitivity of price is independent of precision of private
private signals. Consequently, when the central bank sets γ to make the price level absorb all the
change in the monetary policy, output can be fixed at the efficient level.
Policy Rules
The optimal policy rule is found when the central bank takes into account the effect of policy
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decisions on the beliefs in the private sector, which is factored in the pricing decisions. In this case,
the central bank does not only consider output gap stabilization, but weighs output gap stabilization
with price level stabilization.. Central bank chooses the optimal response function, n= γn f ga¯ prior
to the realization of shocks. The objective function can be written in terms of
maxγn f g−E
[(





subject to the price and output level specified in equation (3.22) and (3.23).
The optimal monetary policy, is found to be: (see Appendix C.3 for derivation)












In Figure 3.2, I plot the value of γn f g at varying precision of private signals, comparing with
price stabilization policy and output gap minimization policy. If the central bank considers only
price stabilization, it achieves so by making p=
(αγ∗n f g−β )κs−βκa
κa+ακs a¯= 0, which results in γ
price stab




α . The output gap stabilization policy is the same one as the optimizing discretionary policy,
i.e., γn f g = βα −β .
When the private signals become more precise, the central bank with only price stabilization
goal reduces its the sensitivity of aggregate nominal demand to aggregate technology. The reason is
that without the response of monetary policy, the marginal change in price to aggregate technology
shock is −β (κs+κa)ακs+κa . When κs increases, the aggregate price becomes more sensitive, so the central
bank adjust by making nominal aggregate demand less sensitive to aggregate technology shock.
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Figure 3.2: The Equilibrium Price and Output under Optimal Policy Rule without Forward Guid-
ance




α , and output gap stabi-
lization policy is solved as γn f g = βα −β . The second figure plots the equilibrium price and output
dynamics under optimal policy rule.
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With precise private information, real dichotomy holds and real output are independent with
monetary policy. Thus, optimal monetary policy stabilizes price level. In comparison, with im-
precise information, monetary policy has little impact on firms pricing decisions, as firms are
reluctant to update beliefs on aggregate shocks and the reaction of monetary policy on aggregate
shocks. Therefore, optimal monetary policy targets output gap stabilization.
The optimal policy rule without forward guidance can be summarized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5: Under imperfect information and without forward guidance, the optimal mon-
etary policy rule shifts from output gap stabilization to price stabilization when the precision of
private signals increases.
3.3.2 Instrument-based Odyssean Forward Guidance
Forward guidance is modeled as central bank providing its estimate of its monetary policy at the
stage in which firms make pricing decisions. Instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance refers
to the situation in which after announcing the forward guidance policy in this stage, central bank
commits to the policy action in the final stage. In other words, the central bank does not re-optimize
when perfect information becomes available in later stage.
At the time when the central bank announces instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance
policy, it is also subject to imperfect information. Therefore, the forward guidance can only con-
ditional on the noisy signal that the central bank has, rather than the actual aggregate technology.
I study the class of aggregate nominal demand policy that is linear to the central bank’s noisy
information.
n = g(m) = γm.
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There are two pieces of information which are conveyed through the instrument-based Odyssean
forward guidance. First is a public signal about the aggregate technology shock, with which private
agents form expectations about the aggregate technology shock, together with their private signals.
Second, private agents have perfect information on the actual aggregate nominal demand in the
last stage, as the central bank commits not to re-optimize.
The second informational effect can be modeled in two ways. First, the central bank can
directly announces its imperfect information about the aggregate technology, denoted by m, and
communicates how monetary policy will respond to it, which is captured by γo f g. The second way
to model it is that since the aggregate nominal demand policy is linear in only one variable, and
private agents have rational expectations on the central bank’s behaviors, private agents are able to
back out the informational held by the central bank when it observes n. i.e., m = nγ .
After an aggregate technology shock, providing forward guidance narrows the gap between the
expected and the actual aggregate technology shock. Specifically, Upon receiving the information
provided by the central bank, the information set of individual firms becomes ωi = {m, ai}, with








As optimal prices are strategic complements, they depend on higher order beliefs on the aggre-





































Iterating the process results in the higher order beliefs on the aggregate technology when firms















After an aggregate technology shock, providing forward guidance narrows this gap between
expected and the actual aggregate technology shock.
Different from the benchmark case in which private agents use their estimates about the ag-
gregate technology to form expectations about the aggregate nominal demand, under instrument-
based Odyssean forward guidance, private agents know the aggregate demand exactly. Substitute
Eni E¯






























Equation (3.34) and (3.35) describe the equilibrium price level and output as functions of signal
precision. The first thing to notice is that output is independent to γo f g. This is because as monetary
policy is known by firms make pricing decisions, prices absorb all the effect of monetary policy,
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leaving monetary policy unable to affect the real demand of households. As a result, the central
bank does not have the trade-off between price level stabilization and output gap stabilization, and
optimal monetary policy always stabilizes price level.
However, although there is no longer conflict between price stabilization and output gap stabi-
lization, central bank faces another conflict between minimizing deviations after technology shocks
and minimizing deviations after policy shocks, as the nominal demand responds to the noise in the
central bank’s information in the same ways as it responds to the actual technology shocks.
Equation (3.35) shows that the output become more sensitive to aggregate technology when
either public signals or private signals become more precise. This shows that by providing forward
guidance, central bank makes the equilibrium output closer to the efficient level.
At the same time, providing forward guidance also makes the aggregate price level more sensi-
tive to aggregate technology shocks. This seems to be detrimental as price fluctuations are welfare
reducing, but this effect can be offset if central bank adjust the response, γo f g accordingly.
Optimal Instrument-based Odyssean Forward Guidance
The central bank commits to implement the nominal aggregate demand that only conditions
on its noisy signal, m. I study the class of commitment that is linear to m. Optimal instrument-
based Odyssean forward guidance policy can be described as the choice of γ which maximizes the
expected objective function conditional on m. In addition, since the choice of γ does not affect






I plot the solution in the following figure:
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Figure 3.3: Optimal Instrument-based Odyssean Forward Guidance
In the above figure, parameter values are chosen as σ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.5, ε = 2, which makes α = 0.35
and β = 0.75. Public signal refers to the central bank’s signal about the aggregate technology with
precision κm = 1σ2m





























The central bank balances between minimizing deviations after actual aggregate technology
shocks and after noise shocks. when choosing the optimal γ . As shown in this figure, when the
precision of public signals increases, γ∗ increases. The intuition is that when precision of public
signal is less precise, the central bank are less confident on its measurement and thus reacts less
aggressively to its own measurement.
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Figure 3.4: The Equilibrium Price and Output under Optimal Instrument-based Odyssean Forward
Guidance
In the above figure, parameter values are chosen as σ = 0.2, ϕ = 0.5, ε = 2, which makes α = 0.35
and β = 0.75. Both the aggregate technology shock and the noise shock are of size 0.1.
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In Figure 3.4, I plot the equilibrium price level and the output gap after a technology shock
and a noise shock. Comparing with Figure 3.2 shows that instrument-based Odyssean forward
guidance improves ex-post welfare after the technology shock, as both the equilibrium output and
the price level become closer to the target levels. On the other hand, instrument-based Odyssean
forward guidance introduces fluctuations due to noise shock in the central bank’s information. This
suggests that there exists time inconsistency problem, as the central bank wants to re-optimize after
noise shocks, which I analyze in the following section.
3.3.3 Delphic Forward Guidance
This section studies the time-consistent forward guidance policy, which I refer to as Delphic for-
ward guidance. Under this strategy, the central bank only reveals its estimation about the aggregate
technology shock through forward guidance, and does not commit to any policy actions. Private
agents with rational expectations anticipate that the central bank will implement the actual nominal
aggregate demand to close the output gap in the last stage, taking prices as given. I characterize
the Delphic forward guidance with backward induction, which internalizes the expectations in the
private sector about the re-optimization of monetary policy.
As the actual policy under Delphic forward guidance depends on two state variables: the aggre-
gate technology and the noise in the central bank’s information, private agents need to separately
form higher order beliefs on the aggregate technology shock and the policy error.
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Higher Order Beliefs on the Aggregate Nominal Demand
The actual nominal demand policy now depends on two state variables, the actual technology
shock, a¯, and the noise in the central bank’s signal, υ :
n = γaa¯+ γυυ (3.38)
When central bank announces the forward guidance policy, it describes its estimate of the actual
shock, m, and how it is going to react to it, γad f g. This is equivalent to announcing the estimate of
the aggregate nominal demand to be:
E [n|m] = γam = γa (a¯+υ) (3.39)
The difference between the announced Delphic forward guidance policy and the actual policy
is:
E [n|m]−n = (γa− γυ)υ (3.40)
The case of instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance in the previous section can then be
described by restricting γa = γυ .
Private agents need to form expectations about the noise in the central bank’s information.
In addition, as optimal prices are strategic complements, both the higher order beliefs about the
aggregate technology shock and about the policy error play a role in determining aggregate price
level. In the first stage when price-setting takes places, all firms need to form expectations on both
a¯ and n. Firm i’s conditional expectation on a¯ is same as in the case under forward guidance with









To guess n, firms separately form expectations about the two state variables to which n reacts:
the aggregate technology and the policy error:
Ein = γaEia¯+ γvEiυ (3.42)
The expectation on υ is formed as the difference between m and Eia¯. In other words, firms treat
the difference between their estimation and the central bank’s estimation as the noise in the central
bank’s information.
Eiυ = Eim−Eia¯ = m−Eia¯ (3.43)
Consequently, as long as information is not perfect, private firms under-estimate (over-estimate)
the aggregate technology shock after the aggregate technology shock (noise shock).
To form expectations on the aggregate nominal demand after re-optimization, substitute Eia¯
















This expression shows that when the central bank re-optimizes monetary policy, which can be
captured by the difference between γa and γυ , private agents use both the public signal and their
private signals to form expectations on the aggregate demand. This is due to the fact that private
agents use their private signals on aggregate technology to guess the noise in the public signal.
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In the following passage, I simplify the expression of equation (3.44) as:
Ein = ρmm+ρaai (3.45)
where ρm = γa κmκm+κs+κa + γ
υ κs+κa
κm+κs+κa , and ρa = (γ
a− γv) κsκm+κs+κa .
As optimal prices are strategic complements, higher order beliefs about the aggregate nominal
demand affect the aggregate price level. To calculate the higher order beliefs, start with expressing
first order average expectations on aggregate demand as:
E¯n = (ρm+ρa)a¯+ρmυ . (3.46)
Applying individual expectation, Ei to the above equation results in:









which shows that the weight on public signal increases as beliefs are taken to a higher order.
Continuing this process to get the j− th order beliefs on the nominal aggregate demand:
EiE¯ jn = ρmm+ρaEiE¯ j−1a¯ (3.48)
In the following figures, I plot the evolution of higher order beliefs after an aggregate technol-
ogy shock (Figure 3.6) and after a policy shock (Figure 3.7). I compare the higher order beliefs
on monetary policy when central bank re-optimize strongly (γa−γυ = 0.5) and when central bank
re-optimize less strongly (γa− γυ = 0.1).
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Figure 3.5: K-th order beliefs after an Aggregate Technology Shock
Figure 3.6 shows that while the actual aggregate nominal demand is 1, private agents under-
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estimate the aggregate nominal demand, because they cannot distinguish whether the shock is an
aggregate technology shock (in which case they expect n raises by 1 unit) or a noise shock (in
which case they expect n raises by 0.5 unit). The gap between the actual and the expected nominal
demand increases when beliefs are taken to a higher order. In addition, the gap increases when the
central bank re-optimizes to a larger extent, which is captured by a larger difference between γa
and γυ .
Figure 3.6 shows that after a noise shock in the central bank’s information, private agents
over-estimate the aggregate nominal demand. This is because agents assign a positive probability
to the event that the realized shock is an aggregate technology shock in which case aggregate
nominal demand increases by 1 unit rather than 0.5 unit. This gap between the expected and the
actual aggregate nominal demand increases when beliefs are taken to higher orders and when the
difference between γad f g and γ
υ
d f g is larger.
The difference between the actual re-optimized monetary policy, n, and the average expectation
on it depends on the precision of public and private signals. First, if information is perfect in the
private sector, i.e., κs = ∞, then E¯n = n, meaning that the private sector can perfectly predicts the
aggregate nominal demand after re-optimization. When the central bank has perfect information,
κm = ∞, then E¯n = γa (a¯+υ), suggesting that the private sector believes the actual policy after
re-optimization is the same as the forward guidance with commitment.
Another interesting scenario is when the information of the central bank has zero precision.
In this situation, after an aggregate technology shock, the average expectation on policy error is
E¯v = m− κsκs+κaa, suggesting that even if the error in the central bank’s signal is realized to be
zero, the private sector believes that the policy error is between (0,1), because the private agents
underestimate the realization in the technology shock due to their imperfect information.
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Figure 3.6: K-th order beliefs after an Policy Shock
Equilibrium price level is found by substituting the higher order beliefs on aggregate technol-
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ogy shocks and on noise shocks. (derivations in Appendix C.5):
p = (φm+φa)a¯+φmυ (3.49)

















ρa = (γa− γv) κsκm+κs+κa (3.54)
Time Inconsistency Problem
This section shows the time inconsistency problem for instrument-based Odyssean forward guid-
ance policy, which can be shown as the incentive for central bank to choose γυ different from γa.
The time inconsistency problem raises due to the change in the central bank’s objective function:
the instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance policy is chosen to minimize the price fluctua-
tions, but once prices are fixed, the central bank’s objective changes to output gap stabilization. As
the household has perfect information, the central bank wants to make the actual nominal demand
to contingent on the actual shocks.
Mathematically, after the instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance policy is announced
and prices are determined, the central bank wants to re-optimize in a way which makes ∂ yˆt∂a = 0 and
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∂ p
∂υ = 0, which is equivalent to:
γa−φm−φa = βα (3.55)
γυ −φm = 0 (3.56)
The solution of the above equations requires that the difference between γa and γυ to be:
γa− γυ = β
α
−β . (3.57)
at which the output gap is completely closed after both technology shocks and noise shocks.
In the following figure, I show the equilibrium price and output level after a technology shock
and after a noise shock when the central bank announces the optimal Odyssean forward guidance,
but actually deviate to re-optimize in the last stage, i.e., I take γa the same value as the optimizing
policy under forward guidance with commitment, and then take γυ to close the output gap. As
shown in the figures, firms set prices after taking into account policy re-optimization.
Comparing this figure with Figure 3.5 shows that after a positive technology shock, the aggre-
gate price level decreases to a larger extent. In both of the two cases, the actual aggregate nominal
demand is the same, the realized shock is an aggregate technology shock and the sensitivity of
monetary policy to technology shocks are the same in both cases. However, when private agents
expect the central bank to re-optimize, they understand that the central bank reduces the aggregate
nominal demand after a noise shock is realized. Consequently, the expected aggregate nominal
demand is lower than the actual one.
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Figure 3.7: The Equilibrium Price and Output after Re-optimization
The figure compares instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance with re-optimization. When
re-optimization is expected, the aggregate price level is lower after both actual technology shocks
and noise shocks.
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Comparing the sensitivity of aggregate price level to noise shocks shows that after a posi-
tive noise shock, the increase in price is smaller after re-optimization. This is because under
re-optimization, private agents know that with positive possibility, the realized shock is a noise
shock, in which case the aggregate nominal demand after re-optimization is smaller.
Lemma 5: If the central bank announces the optimal instrument-based Odyssean forward
guidance policy but re-optimizes, it is able to completely close the output gap. However, if such
deviation is anticipated by the private sector, the aggregate price becomes more sensitive to aggre-
gate technology shocks.
Proof see Appendix.
Delphic Forward Guidance Policy with Backward Induction
The policy trade-off described in Lemma 5 can be solved by a discretionary Delphic forward
guidance with backward induction. In the second step, the central bank chooses how it reacts to
the noise shock to close the output gap. In the first step, the central bank chooses how it reacts to
its signal about the aggregate technology shock. In the following figure, I plot the Delphic forward
guidance policy with backward induction at different precision of public signals. Comparing this
with Figure 7 shows that when the central bank receives a positive signal of aggregate technology
shock, it should increases nominal demand more if it expects to re-optimize after a noise shock.
The reason is that it will reduce the actual aggregate nominal demand if the signal it receives is a
positive noise, and such re-optimization is anticipated by private agents with positive possibility.
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Figure 3.8: Delphic Forward Guidance with Backward Induction
In the following figures, I plot the aggregate price and output after technology shocks and noise
shocks when the central bank does forward guidance with re-optimization. Comparing this with
the equilibrium price and the output gap under commitment, it shows that the price dynamics are
the same whereas the output gap is completely closed under re-optimization.
124
Figure 3.9: The Equilibrium Price and Output under Delphic Forward Guidance
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3.3.4 Rule-base Odyssean Forward Guidance
In this section, I study the optimal state-contingent policy rule, which I refer to as rule-based
Odyssean forward guidance. There is Delphic component, in the sense that the actual monetary
policy conditions on future information, but the central bank is not discretionary, as it does not
regard the aggregate price as fixed.
Mathematically, the optimal state-contingent policy rule is chosen by choosing γa and γυ in the
beginning of period to maximize the ex-ante loss:
max{γa, γυ}−E
[(





Figure 3.10: Optimal Rule-based Odyssean Forward Guidance
In other words, the central bank relaxes the restriction that (1) being an instrument-based
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Odyssean forward guidance in which case γa = γυ and (2) being Delphic in which case γa− γυ =
β
α −β . The solution of optimal rule-base Odyssean forward guidance policy is provided in Ap-
pendix C.6.
I plot the value of {γa, γυ} at varying precision of public information in Figure 3.10. Com-
paring this figure with Figure 3.8, we find that when public signals are very imprecise, the optimal
rule for Delphic forward guidance policy is to be more sensitive to the signal of actual shock, and
reduce the aggregate nominal demand if the signal turns out to be a noise instead of an actual
shock.
Intuitively, when public information about the aggregate technology is very imprecise, firms
want to decrease their prices after receiving their private signals, because for a given sensitivity of
aggregate nominal demand to technology shocks, firms under-estimate the positive response in the
aggregate nominal demand. Consequently, the central bank increases its sensitivity to aggregate
nominal demand shocks.
At the same time, the central bank commits to reduce the actual nominal aggregate demand
after noise shocks. Consequently, firms increase their prices by a less amount after noise shocks.
This leads to the time-inconsistency problem: firms have increased prices after receiving the public
signal from the forward guidance, and a reduction in the actual nominal aggregate demand will
decrease the real output.
I plot the equilibrium aggregate price level and the output level in the following figure. It shows
that the central bank reduces the sensitive of the aggregate price level after technology shocks at
the cost of output gap fluctuations. At the same time, after a positive policy shock, the increase in
the aggregate price level is reduced, at the cost of a negative output gap.
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In this paper, I analyzed the optimal conduct of monetary policy when both the private sector
and the central bank have imperfect information about the underlying economic fundamentals.
Forward guidance is defined as the central bank providing its forecast about the monetary policy
conditional on its imperfect information. Literature has distinguished two strategies to conduct
forward guidance, which are instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance and Delphic forward
guidance. This paper finds that the optimal way to conduct monetary policy is making state-
contingent commitment, which I call the rule-based Odyssean forward guidance policy.
To study the effect of monetary policy under imperfect information, I built a New Keynesian
economy where prices are perfectly flexible across periods, but completely rigid within a period.
Firms set prices under imperfect information, and households make consumption decisions after
perfect information is revealed. The central bank decides the aggregate nominal demand to af-
fect the consumption decisions of households. Consequently, the expectations of firms about the
aggregate nominal demand becomes the center of the discussion.
If information is perfect and private agents have rational expectations on the central bank’s
behavior, firms are able to perfectly foresee the aggregate nominal demand. Consequently, the
real dichotomy holds. However, when firms have imperfect information about the realization of
the aggregate technology, even they perfectly understand the reaction function of the central bank
to the aggregate technology shocks, they still have imperfect information on the actual nominal
aggregate demand. Consequently, the real dichotomy breaks down.
With instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance, the central bank announces its noisy infor-
mation about the aggregate technology, and commits to implement the aggregate nominal demand
which is optimal conditional on its noisy information. In comparison, under Delphic forward guid-
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ance, the central bank only reveals its information on the economic fundamentals without commit-
ting to any policy response. As private agents have rational expectations, they form expectation
on the actual nominal aggregate demand by combining the public signal from the Delphic forward
guidance and their private signals about the aggregate technology shocks.
Time inconsistency problem arises after the central bank announces the instrument-based Odyssean
forward guidance: if a noise shock is realized, the central bank wants to re-optimize to close the
output gap. However, if such deviation is anticipated by private agents, the optimization makes the
aggregate price more sensitive to aggregate technology shocks. To solve this policy trade-off, the
optimal Delphic forward guidance is found by backward induction. Lastly, I analyzed the optimal
strategy which is a rule-based Odyssean forward guidance. By making state-contingent commit-
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Log-Linearization and Aggregation
From the household first order conditions, we first do log-linear approximation to the Euler equa-
tion by
yt = Etyt+1− 1σ (it−Etpit+1) (A.1.1)
The log-linear approximation to the labor supply is ϕnt( j)+σyt = wt( j) where wt denotes the log




t ∀ j, which
further implies ct = yt . We can then write the labor supply as follows:
ϕnt( j)+σyt = wt( j) (A.1.2)
Next, we want to relate individual firm’s real marginal cost of production to aggregate output.
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To to this, first integrate equation A.1.2
∫
wt( j) = ϕ
∫
nt( j)d j+σyt (A.1.3)
Then, substitute the log-linear approximation of the individual good demand, i.e., yt( j)− yt =
−ε (pt( j)− pt), which results in:
∫




at( j) = yt−at (A.1.4)
Substitute this into
∫
wt( j), and then deduct at from both sides:
∫
wt( j)−at( j) = (φ +σ)yt− (1+ϕ)at (A.1.5)
Define natural level of output as the equilibrium output level without price rigidity and under
perfect information, which makes ynt as a linear function of aggregate technology. Then, write the
above equation in terms of output gap:
∫
wt( j)−at( j) = (φ +σ)(yt− ynt ) (A.1.6)
We know move on to the firm’s side. Taking log-linear approximation of individual firm’s
optimal resetting prices:
p∗t ( j) = (1−βθ)E jt
{
Σ(βθ)k [pt+k +ut+k( j)+wt+k( j)−at+k( j)]
}
(A.1.7)
The Calvo assumption implies that the aggregate price index is an average of the price charged
by the fraction of 1−θ of firms which reset their prices at t, and the fraction of θ of firms whose
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prices remain as the last period prices. Thus, the log-linear approximation of the aggregate price
in period t becomes:
pt = θ pt−1+(1−θ)
∫
p∗t ( j)d j (A.1.8)
Subtract pt−1 from both sides to express in terms of inflation:
pit = (1−θ)
(∫
p∗t ( j)− pt−1
)
(A.1.9)
As explained in Section 2.3 of Chapter 1, the subjective beliefs are assumed to be homogeneous
in order to abstract from the higher order beliefs problem in aggregating prices. This assumption
allows me to write individual resetting prices as:




p∗t ( j)d j = (1−βθ)(Est pt +ut +wt−at)+(1−βθ)Σ∞k=1(βθ)kEst (pt+k +wt+k−at+k)
(A.1.11)





t+1( j)d j = (1−βθ)Σ∞k=1Est (pt+k +ut+k +wt+k−at+k) = βθEst p∗t+k (A.1.12)
The second equation holds due to homogeneous beliefs.
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Subtract equation A.1.12 from equation A.1.11
∫
p∗t ( j)d j−βθEst pt+1 = (1−βθ)Est pt +(1−βθ)ut +(1−βθ)(ϕ+σ)yˆ (A.1.13)∫






+Est pt− pt−1+(1−βθ)ut +(1−βθ)(ϕ+σ)yˆt
pit = βθEst pit+1+(1−θ)Est pit +(1−θ)(1−βθ)ut
+(1−βθ)(1−θ)(ϕ+σ)yˆt
In the last equation, I assume that aggregate price is observable after one period, i.e., pt−1 =Est pt−1
Write inflation as:
pit = βθEst pit+1+(1−θ)Est pit +κθ yˆt +ut (A.1.14)
where κ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)(ϕ+σ)θ , and ut = (1−θ)(1−βθ)ut
A.2 Solution to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium under Discre-
tionary Monetary Policy
In this section, I first solve the model with serially uncorrelated shocks and then solve the model
with serially correlated shocks. For both cases, I solve for the fixed point where the beliefs by
people in the private sector on the best response of interest rate at any state match the optimizing
discretionary interest rate. This means that in equilibrium people have rational expectation.
Equilibrium Optimizing Discretionary Policy with Serially Uncorrelated Shocks The so-
lution takes the following steps:





2. With this interest rate, I solve for the beliefs formed about natural-rate shock and cost-push
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shock in the private sector as functions of interest rate.




t ut , the actual shocks, r
n
t and ut , I solve for
yˆt and pit as a function of it .
4. Solve for it that minimizes the loss function, Lt = pi2t +ω yˆt , and express interest rate as actual
shocks, it = Frrnt +Fuut .
5. Iterate the process until convergence.





In step 2, beliefs about underlying shocks follow:
Est r
n
t = Krit (A.2.1)
Est ut = Kuit (A.2.2)
where KrF0r =
F02r σ2r
F02r σ2r +F02u σ2u
, and KuF0u =
F02u σ2u
F02r σ2r +F02u σ2u
.
In step 3, write out the expression of output gap and inflation as function of interest rate:
yˆt =− 1σ (it− r
n
t ) (A.2.3)

















































t ut as functions of it leads to:
λ1rnt +λ2ut +λ3it = 0 (A.2.7)















































Rearranging the above equation to get:
it = F1rnt +F3ut (A.2.8)








A.3 Equilibrium Optimizing Discretionary Policy with Serially
Correlated Shocks
In this section, I solve for the general version of the dynamic information case where I have se-
rially correlated shocks, external signals which captures central bank direct communication, and
implementation error.
The solution method is similar to the case with serially uncorrelated shocks, as solving for
optimizing interest rate in equilibrium involves conjecture of interest rate response function. In
addition to this conjecture, solving equilibrium variables in the private sector also requires addi-
tional step of undetermined coefficient to deal with the subjective expectation of future equilibrium
variables.
















2. With this interest rate, I solve for the beliefs formed about natural-rate shock and cost-push
shock in the private sector as functions of current signals (interest rate and central bank
communication) plus past beliefs.
3. (Undetermined Coefficient) I conjecture that output gap and inflation are linear functions of
current state variables which include actual shocks and past beliefs. As a result, I am able
to express the forward-looking output gap and inflation as functions of current actual shocks
and current beliefs.




t ut , the actual shocks, r
n
t and ut , I solve for
yˆt and pit as a function of it .
142
5. Solve for it that minimizes the loss function, Lt = pi2t +ω yˆt , and express interest rate as actual
shocks, it = Frrnt +Fuut .
6. Iterate the process until convergence.



















which I denote as zt = Φzt−1 + vt , where Φ =
φ 0
0 φu
 and vt = [vt ,vut ] with the white noise of
variance Q.
Signals
As people in private sector have perfect memory of beliefs they have in the past, they are able
to back out the part of interest rate that reacts to current shocks, which I denote as
iˆt ≡ it−F3Est−1rnt−1−F4Est−1ut−1 (A.3.2)

























which I denote as st = Dzt +Rt
Beliefs
People in private sector are Bayesian, and update beliefs through the Kalman Filtering process,






































t +φ (1−K11F1−K12)Est−1rnt−1 (A.3.5)
+(K11F3+K13)ut +φu (−K11F3−K13)Est−1ut−1+K12εrt +K13εut +K11et
Est ut = (K21F1+K22)r
n
t +φ (−K21F1−K22)Est−1rnt−1 (A.3.6)
+(K21F3+K23)ut +φu (1−K21F3−K23)Est−1ut−1+K22εrt +K23εut +K21et
















Ψ(13)εut +Ψ(14)et . I will use this notation in solving equilibrium in the private sector by the
method of undetermined coefficients.
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In step 3, the first write out the the forward-looking output gap and inflation as:




















pit = βθEst pit+1+(1−θ)Est pit +κθ yˆt +ut (A.3.8)
Following the method of undetermined coefficients, I first need to conjecture that equilib-
rium variables are linear functions to current state variables, which include current actual shocks












γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4



















Next, substitute this conjecture into the forward-looking variables, Et yˆt+1 and Est pit+1. Notice




γ1φ + γ2 γ3φu+ γ4



































Next work on pit , as the actual inflation also includes the expected current inflation, and ex-
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pected current inflation includes expected current output gap, I first need to calculate:
Est yˆt = Et yˆt+1−
1
σ
[it−Est rnt −Est pit+1] (A.3.12)













Substitute Etpit into pit :









+κθ yˆt +ut (A.3.14)










{(γ8φ + γ9)Est rnt +(γ10φu+ γ11)Est ut}+
1−θ
θ
Est ut +κθ yˆt +ut
=
{






















it +κθ yˆt +ut





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0                       
c
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In step 5, in order to solve for the optimizing interest rate, I first need to specify central bank’s
objective function.
Central Bank Objective Function
As current interest rate has persistent effect through the dynamic learning process, central bank
also considers how current interest rate affect future equilibrium. Consequently, the loss function
includes output gap and inflation of current and all future periods.
EtL(t) = [pi2t +ω yˆ
2
t ]+βEt(L(t+1)) (A.3.15)

























The central banks expectation is objective, denoted by Et , in the sense that it observes all past
shocks, and expects all future shocks to be zero. The information set of central bank at period t is:










]′ denote the persistent state variables. So the central bank’s
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γ8 γ9 γ10 γ11
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4























φ 0 0 0
K11F1+K12 φ(1−K11F1−K12) K11F3+K13 −φu(K11F3+K13)
0 0 φu 0
K21F1+K22 −φ(K21F1+K22) K21F3+K23 φu(1−K21F3−K23

Combine it with A.3.17 Etpit+ j
Et yˆt+ j
= ΓΛ j−1Etzt+1 (A.3.19)
Substitute into the Et(L(t+1)):
Σβ jEtz′t+1(Λ
j−1)′Γ′ΩΓΛ j−1Etzt+1 ≡ Σβ jEtz′t+1Θ j−1Etzt+1 (A.3.20)














j∆( j−1) = 0 (A.3.21)
where















































≡ ∆ j−1(1)rnt +∆ j−1(2)ut +∆ j−1(3)Est ut +∆ j−1(4)Est rnt












t = (φ(1−K11F1−K12)−K11F2)Est−1rnt−1 (A.3.22)
− (K11F4+φu(K11F3+K13))Est−1ut−1+K12rnt +K13ut +K11it
Est ut = (φ
u(1−K21F3−K23)−K21F4)Est−1ut−1 (A.3.23)
− (φ(K21F1+K22)+K21F2)Est−1rnt−1+K22rnt +K23ut +K21it
Output gap:
































































































































































0 = λ1{(φ(1−K11F1−K12)−K11F2)Est−1rnt−1− (K11F4+φu(K11F3+K13))Est−1ut−1
+K12rnt +K13ut +K11it}+λ2{(φu(1−K21F3−K23)−K21F4)Est−1ut−1
− (φ(K21F1+K22)+K21F2)Est−1rnt−1+K22rnt +K23ut +K21it}+λ3rnt +λ4ut +λ5it
The above equation solves the optimal nominal interest rate. Comparing with the guessed form
yields the solution of [F1, F2, F3, F4]
F1 =−λ1K12+λ2K22+λ3λ1K11+λ2K21+λ5 (A.3.36)






I iterate the process until the conjectured interest rate function matches the above solution.
A.4 Proofs
A.4.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The first (change of slope) and second point (intercept after cost push shock) are obvious. The
following shows the proof for the their point (the sign of intercept after natural rate shock). The
sign depends on the combination of parameter values and expectation on interest rate reaction
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< 1 and 0 < ∂E
s
t ut
∂u < 1 as long as both F1 and F3 are non-zero. However, K11 =
∂Est rnt
∂ it
may be greater or less than one, depending on whether F1 is greater or smaller than 1. Conse-
quently, the sign of the impact of rnt on the intercept of Phillips Curve under imperfect information,{
(1−θ) κσ (K11−1)+ 1−θθ K21
}
is ambiguous.
A.4.2 Second Order Approximation of Household’s Utility Function
Follow Woodford (2003), Gali (2010), Walsh (2010) to prove that maximizing the utility of house-





(ε−1+ϕ)ε2var j(pt( j))+(σ +ϕ)yˆ2t
)
(A.4.1)
The next step is to prove the relationship between var j(pt( j))with var(pit). Denote ∆t = var j[logp jt ].
Since var jP¯t−1 = 0, we have
∆t = var j[logp jt− P¯t−1] (A.4.2)
= E j[logp jt− P¯t−1]2− [E jlogp jt− P¯t−1]2
= E j[logp jt−1− P¯t−1]2+(1−θ)(
∫
p∗t j− P¯t−1)2− (P¯t− P¯t−1)2
As noted in Appendix A.1, P¯t = (1− θ)
∫
p∗t j + θ P¯t−1, we have (1− θ)
∫
logp∗t j + θ p¯t−1, which













(p¯− p¯t−1)2. Applying the definition




tpi2t + t.i.p. (A.4.4)
A.4.3 Proof of Lemma 4
To prove the optimal response for a discretionary rate, express out the inflation expression in
Lemma 3, pit =−Ryˆt as follows:
κ yˆt +Ωr (Kr−1)rnt +ΩuKu+ut =−Ryˆt (A.4.5)















To prove that Fr > 1 is equivalent to prove ΩrKr +ΩuKu >Ωr which is just Assumption 1.








⇔ΩrKr +ΩuKu < 1σ (R−R
p)




















Importantly, the RHS is just the difference between Rp and R, as it measures the sensitivity inflation
to beliefs.






⇔ ω < Rp ·R
As Lemma 3 suggests that R>Rp, the sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is that
R > R¯≡√ω , where ω is defined as the second order approximation of household utility.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 1 take two steps. First I show that evaluated at the equilibrium optimiz-
ing discretionary interest rate, the partial derivative of combined Kalman gains weighted by their
effects on inflation is negative with respect to Fr and is positive with respect to Fu.
Step 1: Under the assumption that σr = σu, I prove the following result.
Result 1. Ωr ∂Kr∂Fr +Ωu
∂Ku
∂Fr < 0
Result 2. Ωr ∂Kr∂Fu +Ωu
∂Ku
∂Fu > 0






































where D = F2r σ2r +F2u σ2u .
To show Result 1, notice that ∂Ku∂Fr < 0, so it becomes sufficient to show
∂Kr
∂Fr . This inequality
holds when Fu < Fr under discretion. From Lemma 4, we know that Fr > F
p
r = 1, and Fu < θF pu .
In addition, we can derive the optimizing discretionary interest rate under perfect information to




θ , which leads to Fu < 1. Under σr = and Fr > Fu, we have
∂Kr
∂Fr < 0.
To show Result 2 is involves more steps. First, we know that ∂Kr∂Fu ,0, and under parameter
specifications, 0 < Ωr < Ωu. Thus, the sufficient condition for Result 2 to be hold is Ωu ∂Kr∂Fu +

















u −F2u σ2uσ2u −2FrFuσ2r σ2u
)
(B.1.1)
Holding Fr fixed, the quadratic function f (Fu) = F2r σ2r σ2u −F2u σ2uσ2u − 2FrFuσ2r σ2u reaches max-
imum at negative value of Fu. The range of Fu is [0,Fr] (Lemma 4). So, I only need to show
f (0)> 0 and f (Fr)< 0.




u > 0 (B.1.2)
f (Fr) =−2FrFrσ2r σ2u < 0 (B.1.3)
This completes the prove of Result 2.
Step 2: I prove that Result 1 and Result 2 makes Proposition 2 to hold.
Part 1, Fcr > Fdr
Suppose on the contrary that Fcr = F
d
r . Then, express out the first order condition on Fr after























Under Assumption 1, The LHS of E.1 is smaller than the LHS of E.2, which makes yˆtpit to be







The necessary condition for this inequality to hold is 1: Fcr > F
d
r , or pict < pidt .
Next, write out the expression for pict < pidt :
− 1
σ
(Fr−1)+ΩrKrFr +ΩuKuFr|comm <− 1σ (Fr−1)+ΩrKrFr +ΩuKuFr|disc (B.1.7)
The necessary condition for this inequality to hold is: either Fcr > F
d
r , or ΩrKrFr+ΩuKuFr|comm <
ΩrKrFr+ΩuKuFr|disc. Under Assumption, this implies Fcr > Fdr . In conclusion, we have Fcr > Fdr .
Part 2, Fcu < Fdu
Suppose on the contrary that Fcu = F
d
u . Then, express out the first order condition on Fu after
ut shock for both discretionary central bank and central bank with commitment, which is pit ∂pit∂Fu +




















Under Assumption 2, The LHS of A.4.2 is smaller than the LHS of B.1.8, which makes yˆtpit to







The necessary condition for this inequality to hold is 1: Fcu < F
d
u , or pict > pidt .
Next, write out the expression for pict < pidt after ut shock:
− 1
σ
Fu+ΩrKrFu+ΩuKuFu|comm <− 1σ Fu+ΩrKrFu+ΩuKuFu|disc (B.1.11)
The necessary condition for this inequality to hold is: either Fcu < F
d
u , or ΩrKrFu+ΩuKuFu|comm <
ΩrKrFu+ΩuKuFu|disc. Under Assumption 2, this implies Fcu < Fdu . In conclusion, we have Fcu >
Fdu .
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 4













































After Kr and Ku are determined, the optimal one-time discretionary interest rate aims to mini-




subjected to the constraint that pit = {κ−σ (ΩrKr +ΩuKu)} yˆt +(Ωr(Kr−1)+ΩuKu)rt +u. The









As long as Fr 6= 0 and Fu 6= 0, B.2.4 is different from equation B.2.1 and B.2.2, which implies
that one-time discretionary interest rate is different from the response of interest rate under op-
timal policy rule. Since the one-time discretionary interest rate is derived from the ex-post loss
minimization problem, it implies that there is always a profitable deviation.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Price-setting under Higher Order Belief
This section derives the optimal prices set by individual firms as functions their higher order beliefs
on the aggregate technology shocks and the aggregate price level.
From pi = Ei [p+αy]−βai, substitute the real output by the aggregate nominal demand as y
by y = n− p:
pi = Ei [p+α (n− p)]−βai (C.1.1)
= (1−α)Ei p+αEin−βai (C.1.2)
Next, to dealt with the aggregate price level in log-linear form, I first take log-linear approxima-




i di, which yields p =
∫ 1
0 pidi. Substitute the aggregate









which can be simplified as:
pi = (1−α)2EiE¯ p+α(1−α)EiE¯n+αEin− (1−α)βEia¯−βai (C.1.4)
where I use E¯ [·] to be average expectation operator:
∫ 1
0
E j (·)d j = E¯ (·) (C.1.5)
E¯ j [·] =
∫
EiE¯ j−1 [·]di = E¯E¯ j−1 (C.1.6)
Iterating this substitution process leads to the optimal individual price with higher order beliefs:
pi = (1−α)∞EiE¯∞p+αΣ∞j=0(1−α) jEiE¯ jn−βΣ∞j=0(1−α) j+1EiE¯ ja¯−βai (C.1.7)
C.2 Second Order Approximation to Household’s Welfare




























From market clearing condition, C = Y . I use yˆ to denote log deviation from steady state level




, and take second order approximation by using the Taylor series expansion
Y




















































as the price dispersion adjusted by idiosyncratic shocks.













aˆ2i + ε pˆiaˆi (C.2.4)




































































vari (ai)+ εcov(pi ai)





















































(σUcC−ψUnN)(yˆ− yn)2+ εvari (pi)
}
(C.2.10)
Private signals make cov(pi, ai) to be dependent on the precision of signals, which makes
the weight between the price level and the output gap stabilization dependent on the precision of
signals. For simplicity, I assume a constant weight when discussing optimal monetary policy in








C.3 Benchmark Case: No Forward Guidance
This section derives the aggregate price level and the output level in the benchmark case in which
the central bank sets the nominal aggregate demand in the last stage and does not give forward
guidance. In this situation, firms use their private information on the aggregate technology shock
to form expectations about the monetary policy.
I study the class of optimal policy which is linear to the aggregate technology shock, n =
γα , which makes individual expectations about the aggregate nominal demand take the form:
















































I guess and verify that the higher order expectation on p is less than 11−α , which makes (1−















C.4 Instrument-based Odyssean Forward Guidance
Instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance changes the pricing behaviors in two aspects. (1) on
Eia¯: firms use both their private signals of firm-specific technologies and the public signal which
they get from the forward guidance to form expectations about the aggregate technology. (2) on
Ein: instead of using expectations about the aggregate technology to form expectations about the
aggregate demand, the Odyssean forward guidance gives the exact information on the aggregate
nominal demand to private agents, so Ein = n.
166


























where I denote K = κm+κs+κξ .
















































In addition, firms do not need to form expectation on n, since they observe n perfectly. Similarly
as the benchmark case, I guess and verify that higher order expectation on p does not explode, and
thus equation C.1.7 now becomes
pi = αΣ∞j=1(1−α) j−1n−βΣ∞j=1(1−α) jEiE¯ j−1a¯−βai (C.4.5)
where Ein is substituted by the actual aggregate nominal demand, n. Now, substitute the higher
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order expectations on the aggregate technology by equation C.4.4

















































+ · · ·
}
(C.4.8)
where Λ1 = 1α , Λ2 =
1−α
α , Λ3 =
(1−α)2

































































C.5 Delphic Forward Guidance
Comparing with the case of instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance, firms under Delphic for-
ward guidance need to form expectations about the aggregate nominal demand after re-optimization.
That is, firms need to form conditional expectation on both n and a¯. The conditional expectation
on a¯ is the same as in the case under instrument-based Odyssean forward guidance. As explained
in Chapter 3, the expectations on the aggregate demand is formed using both the private signals
and the public signal about the aggregate technology shock.
Ein = ρmm+ρaai (C.5.1)
where ρm = γa κmκm+κs+κa + γ
υ κs+κa
κm+κs+κa ,ρa = (γ
a− γv) κsκm+κs+κa
To solve for the higher order beliefs, first integrate individual expectations over i, and the apply
Ei: ∫ i
0
Ein = E¯n = ρmm+ρaa¯ (C.5.2)
EiE¯n = ρmm+ρaEia¯ (C.5.3)
E¯2n = ρmm+ρaE¯a¯ (C.5.4)
Iterating this process yields:
EiE¯ jn = ρmm+ρaEiE¯ j−1a¯ (C.5.5)




]−βΣ∞j=1(1−α) jEiE¯ j−1a¯−βai (C.5.6)
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The second term, −βΣ∞j=1(1−α) jEiE¯ j−1a¯−βai has already been solved in the case of forward

















Σ∞j=0(1−α) jρmm+ρaΣ∞j=1(1−α) jEiE¯ j−1a¯+ρaai
}
























































[αρa−β ] (1−α)κsκm+κa+ακs +ρaai−β
}
(C.5.9)
Aggregate over i to get the aggregate price level. Then, take the difference between the aggregate
nominal demand and the price level to get the real output.
p = φmm+φaa¯ = (φm+φa) a¯+φmυ (C.5.10)










φa = [αρa−β ] (1−α)κsκm+κa+ακs +αρa−β (C.5.13)













C.5.1 Output Gap Stabilization Policy
This section derives the necessary conditions for the central bank to close the output gap. This can
be used for two purpose: (1) to illustrate the time inconsistency which is involved with Odyssean
forward guidance, and (2) as the first step in solving the Delphic forward guidance with backward
induction.
As shown in the previous derivations, the output gap is contingent on two aggregate state
variables. To close the output gap is equivalent to make the sensitivity of the aggregate output to







= γυf nc (C.5.16)







Substitute the above equations to the expression of φm and φa, and solve for ρm and ρa as a





















This result leads to the solution of ρm as a function of ρa:







Use this result to solve the expression of ρa
ρa =
(






Use this result to solve for γaf nc− γυf nc by equating it with the definition of ρa:
(


















Plug the expression of
(
γaf nc− γυf nc
)






































γa− γυ = β 1−α
α
(C.5.26)
C.5.2 Proof of Lemma 5
This section prove Lemma 5 by calculating the sensitivity of the aggregate price level under re-
optimization to (1) the aggregate technology shock and (2) the noise shock, and comparing them


















































































































which is less than zero.
C.6 Rule-based Odyssean Forward Guidance
In this section, I solve for the optimal state-contingent policy rule which minimizes the weighted
sum of the variance of the output gap and the variance of inflation. The objective function of the
central bank is written as:






























Re-arrange the above equation to get:
σ2a
{













































where the partial derivatives are calculated are:
∂φm
∂ρm
= 1 (C.6.6)
∂φa
∂ρm
= 0 (C.6.7)
∂φm
∂ρa
= (1−α) κm
ακs+κa+κm
(C.6.8)
∂φa
∂ρa
=
α(1−α)κs
κm+κa+ακs
(C.6.9)
∂ρm
∂γa
=
κm
K
(C.6.10)
∂ρa
∂γa
=
κs
K
(C.6.11)
∂ρa
∂γυ
=
κs+κa
K
(C.6.12)
∂ρa
∂γυ
=−κs
K
(C.6.13)
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